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Abstract
We develop a quantitative business cycle model with search complementarities in the inter-
firm matching process that entails a multiplicity of equilibria. An active static equilibrium
with strong joint venture formation, large output, and low unemployment can coexist
with a passive static equilibrium with low joint venture formation, low output, and high
unemployment. Changes in fundamentals move the system between the two static equilibria,
generating large and persistent business cycle fluctuations. The volatility of shocks is
important for the selection and duration of each static equilibrium. Sufficiently adverse
shocks in periods of low macroeconomic volatility trigger severe and protracted downturns.
The magnitude of government intervention is critical to foster economic recovery in the
passive static equilibrium, while it plays a limited role in the active static equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Search often involves two parties. Workers search for firms and firms search for workers.
Customers search for shops and shops search for customers. Entrepreneurs search for venture
capitalists and venture capitalists search for entrepreneurs.
Two-sided searches generate a strategic complementarity. If the probability of a match is
supermodular on the search effort exerted by the parties, an increase in the search effort by one
party will raise (under some conditions on the search costs function) the other party’s search
effort. Conversely, a decrease in the search effort by one party will lower the other party’s search
effort. Depending on fundamentals (i.e., payoff-relevant variables such as productivity or the
discount factor), this strategic complementarity begets a unique static Nash equilibrium (i.e., an
equilibrium for the current period) where both agents search with low effort, a unique static
Nash equilibrium where both agents search with high effort, or multiple static Nash equilibria
with different search efforts.
In this context, shocks to fundamentals have direct and indirect effects. For example, if
matches are persistent, the direct effect of a higher discount factor is to increase the search
effort by agents, independently of what other agents do. But since all the agents are searching
more, the supermodularity of matching probabilities kicks in. We may get the indirect effect of
a switch from the static Nash equilibrium with low search effort to the static Nash equilibrium
where the search effort is higher than if we only had the direct effect. In other words, search
complementarities amplify and propagate shocks to fundamentals. Loosely speaking, search
complementarities provide a microfoundation for what would appear, at first sight, to be
increasing returns to matching in the spirit of Diamond (1982).
To explore this amplification and propagation mechanism, we build a quantitative business
cycle model and calibrate it to U.S. data. Firms post job vacancies and fill them with workers from
households in an off-the-shelf Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) frictional labor market.
The DMP block of the model gives us a natural framework to analyze unemployment and
vacancies but, for simplicity, will not present search complementarities. Once vacancies are
filled, firms must match among themselves in long-lasting relationships to produce output. This
mechanism captures the inter-firm linkages embedded in contemporary value-added chains. For
example, an airplane manufacturer must find a producer of carbon fiber reinforced thermoplastics
2
(CFRPs) to complete a plane and a CFRPs producer must find an airplane manufacturer that
will purchase its products. In our model, the search effort among firms is supermodular. When
airplane manufacturers and CFRP manufacturers search for each other with high effort, output
is high and unemployment low. Otherwise, output is low and unemployment high.
We interpret the search friction among firms as reflecting the process of firms engaging in
complex relationships, which goes well beyond locating potential partners. We have in mind,
among others, the costly effort by buyers in vendor analysis (in our example, assessing the
quality of CFRPs delivered by a new supplier and checking their suitability for proprietary and
well-guarded production processes) and in completing all the required contractual arrangements,
certifications, and regulatory compliance procedures. For the suppliers, we have in mind the
costly effort related to advertisement and branding, participating in trade fairs, tendering offers,
adapting production processes to highly specific buyer requirements, and setting up supply
procedures to process and track orders from a new buyer. The ample space dedicated to these
topics in bestselling operations management textbooks (e.g., Heizer et al., 2016, or Stevenson,
2018) is compelling evidence of how seriously the industry takes this friction. Besides, the
authors’ insistence on the importance of investing enough resources in building a supply chain
demonstrates the role of effort in succeeding or failing to create an inter-firm match.
In terms of exogenous movements in fundamentals, households are subject to discount factor
shocks, and firms experience productivity shocks. Since households own the firms in the economy,
the discount factor shocks also affect how firms discount the future.
Thus, in our model, the return from establishing a joint venture between firms depends on
fundamentals and on the search effort of potential partners. The latter dependence generates a
region of state variable values where there is a unique passive static equilibrium (where firms
search for partners in the current period with zero effort), a region where there is a unique active
static equilibrium (where firms search for partners in the current period with positive effort),
and a region where both static equilibria exist. In this case, we will assume that the economy
stays in the same static equilibrium as in the previous period: if yesterday firms did not search,
today firms still do not search; if yesterday firms searched with positive effort, today firms still
search. History dependence is both an intuitive and transparent equilibria selection device and
a well-documented predictor of empirical behavior in coordination games similar to ours (see
the classic findings in Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991).
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Since in the active static equilibrium, firms post more vacancies, output is higher, and
unemployment lower than in the passive static equilibrium, shocks to the discount factor –such
as those highlighted by Hall (2017)– induce large aggregate fluctuations by switching the economy
between the regions of uniqueness and the multiplicity of static equilibria. The shocks create
strong non-linearities and bimodal ergodic distributions of endogenous variables, where the mass
around each mode is generated by the economy living in each static equilibrium.
Furthermore, once the economy is at one static equilibrium, it remains there until a sufficiently
large discount factor shock terminates the equilibrium. In the meantime, even if the alternative
static equilibrium reappears, the economy is stuck in the previous static equilibrium. Hence,
search complementarities can transform transitory negative shocks into protracted slumps: a
large negative shock sends the economy to the passive static equilibrium and we must wait for
another large positive shock for the economy to leave it. This phenomenon might explain the
aftermath of the Great Recession in the U.S., where output has remained below trend after the
onset of the crisis and employment-to-population ratios are still depressed. Through the lenses
of our model, the economy moved in 2008 to a static equilibrium with less search, and it has not
abandoned it even after the original adverse shocks evaporated.
Quantitatively, if the model starts from the active equilibrium deterministic steady state, a
one-period adverse shock to the discount factor of 12% moves the system to the passive static
equilibrium, increasing the unemployment rate by 3.2% and reducing output by approximately
15%. The drop in output is in the ballpark of the one observed for the U.S. in the Great
Recession measured as a deviation with respect to trend (which we ignore in our model to
ease notation).1 Using a DSGE model, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) estimate a standard
deviation of the discount factor equal to 5% in the U.S. post-war period. A reduction of 12% in
the discount factor is approximately a two-and-a-half standard deviation fall in the discount
factor, a low probability but not a rare event. Smaller shocks to the discount factor fail to
move the system away from the original static equilibrium, and the properties of the system
are similar to those of conventional business cycle models. By comparison, the observed U.S.
standard deviation of productivity shocks is too small to generate productivity realizations that
move the economy from one static equilibrium to the other.
1Between 2007.Q4 and 2014.Q4, output per capita fell 12.4% in the U.S. with respect to its post-war trend.
In comparison, unemployment increased, at its peak, from 4.4% to 10.0%, around 50% more than in our model.
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The model matches U.S. business cycle statistics, in particular along two moments that have
proven to be challenging to replicate in the past. First, the economy generates a strong internal
propagation of shocks. The autocorrelation of the variables is larger and closer to the observed
data than in standard models without the need to assume highly persistent exogenous shocks. In
our model, instead, persistence comes from history dependence. Second, our economy generates
endogenous movements in labor productivity and more realistic volatility of unemployment than
alternative business cycle models.
All our results come without adding expectational shocks to the model. While we could
include those, we prefer not to do so to focus more sharply on the interaction between shocks to
fundamentals and search complementarities. For the same reason, we will postpone for future
research the study of non-Markov strategies by firms, alternative static equilibrium selection
devices, and limit cycles.
The data support the two central mechanisms in our model: search complementarities and
shocks to the discount factor. To document the existence of search complementarities, we use
the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) database constructed by the BLS. We show how
increases in search effort by suppliers (measured as the number of workers involved in advertising,
marketing, sales, demonstration, and promotion) correlate strongly with increases in the search
effort of industry buyers (measured as the number of workers involved in ordering, buying,
purchasing, and procurement). Shocks to the discount factor —proxied by a broad range of
indexes— are tightly correlated with the volume of intermediate input, output, unemployment,
and partnership creation. Indeed, observed fluctuations in intermediate inputs account for 71%
of fluctuations in total industry gross output.
We also explore how the volatility of shocks shapes fluctuations in the presence of search
complementarities. A fall in macroeconomic volatility, such as the Great Moderation, leads
to increased persistence in labor market downturns.2 Since large shocks are unlikely in the
Great Moderation, once the economy is pushed into the passive static equilibrium due to one of
the rare negative shocks, it takes a long time before a new large rare positive shock allows the
economy to abandon the passive static equilibrium. Under the Great Moderation, recessions
are rarer, but their consequences more severe. Far from being an anomaly, the last decade of
2The reports of the death of the Great Moderation have been greatly exaggerated. See Liu et al. (2019) for
updated evidence.
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disappointing macroeconomic performance is a direct consequence of the Great Moderation,
albeit an unwelcome one.
Finally, we investigate the role of fiscal policy in our model. In our example above, a CFRP
producer can supply an airplane manufacturer or provide materials for the construction of a new,
seismic-resistant public school in California. If the government increases its expenses (modeled
as a rise in government-owned firms such as a new public school), the search incentives for
private firms increase, and the economy can switch from a passive static equilibrium to an active
one. Thus, the fiscal multipliers can be as high as 3.5 when the fiscal stimulus is of just the right
size to move the economy from the passive to the active static equilibrium. On the other hand,
if search effort is already high (or the fiscal expansion too small in a passive static equilibrium),
the fiscal multiplier will be as low as 0.15.
There is a long tradition in economics of linking strategic complementarities to aggregate
fluctuations, going back to Diamond (1982), Weitzman (1982), Howitt (1985), and Diamond and
Fudenberg (1989) and explored by Cooper and John (1988), Chatterjee et al. (1993), Huo and
R´ıos-Rull (2013), and Kaplan and Menzio (2016). Recent papers with strategic complementarities,
but with mechanisms and quantitative implications different from ours, include Taschereau-
Dumouchel and Schaal (2015) (with strategic complementarities in production capacity), Sterk
(2016) (with strategic complementarities created by the lost skills of unemployed workers), and
Eeckhout and Lindenlaub (2018) (with strategic complementarities between on-the-job search
and vacancy posting by firms). Also, similar ideas regarding the large potential effects of fiscal
policy appear in the study of a “big push” a` la Murphy et al. (1989).
How does our paper add to this tradition? First, we analyze how strategic complementarities
interact with shocks to fundamentals in an otherwise standard quantitative business cycle model
without expectational shocks. Our model, while preserving parsimony, improves upon the
empirical performance of conventional business cycle models. Thus, our experiments regarding,
for example, fiscal policy provide quantitative guidance for policymakers. Second, by highlighting
complementarities in search effort and providing empirical evidence for it, we dispense with
increasing returns to scale on production or trading. Third, we postulate an empirically plausible
mechanism for static equilibrium switches through variations in the discount factor of the
household. Fourth, we show the effects of changes to the exogenous volatility of shocks on our
economy, with consequences for the length of static equilibria spells and their switches.
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2 A simple model with search complementarities
To build intuition, we present a simple model with search complementarities. This environment
embodies the mechanisms at work in our fully fledged model with greater transparency, but at
the cost of quantitative implications that are not designed to account for the data.
2.1 Environment
We start with a deterministic version of the model. The economy is composed of a continuum
of islands of unit measure where time is discrete and infinite. Two risk-neutral firms populate
each island. Both firms are owned by a representative household, whose only task is to consume
the aggregate net profits of all firms in the economy. At the start of the period, firms are in
two separate locations within the island, and they must meet to engage in production. If they
do not meet, each firm produces zero output. If they do meet, they jointly produce 2 units of
output that they split into equal parts. At the end of the period, the match is dissolved, and
each firm moves to a new, separate location to search in the next period ex novo. Since we will
analyze symmetric equilibria where all firms follow the same search effort, we drop the island
index. Although realizations of meetings will differ among islands, a law of large numbers will
hold in the aggregate economy and individual matching probabilities will equal the aggregate
share of islands where matches occur. Similarly, since there are no payoff-relevant state variables
carrying information across periods and given our focus on static Nash equilibria for each period,
it is unnecessary to specify a discount factor. Thus, for the moment, we can drop the time index
of each variable.
The probability of meeting is given by a matching function that depends on the search effort
of each firm within the island. Specifically, for a search effort σ1 ∈ [0, 1] of firm 1 and a search
effort σ2 ∈ [0, 1] of firm 2, the matching probability function is:
pi (σ1, σ2) =
1 + σ1 + σ2 + σ1σ2
4
. (1)
This function yields a matching probability of 1/4 when σ1 = σ2 = 0, a probability of 1 when
σ1 = σ2 = 1, and probabilities between 1/4 and 1 in the intermediate cases of search effort.
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For an α ∈ [0, 1), the cost of search effort for firm i ∈ {1, 2} is:
c (σi) =
1 + α
4
σi +
σ3i
3
. (2)
2.2 Nash equilibria
To find the set of Nash equilibria in our model, we look at the problem of firm 1 when it takes
the search effort of firm 2, σ2, as given. The expected profit function of firm 1 is:
J (σ1, σ2) =
1 + σ1 + σ2 + σ1σ2
4
− 1 + α
4
σ1 − σ
3
1
3
.
Maximizing J (σ1, σ2) with respect to σ1 and noticing that the optimal solution is, for some
values of σ2, at a corner of zero optimal search effort, we get the best response function Π (σ2)
for firm 1:
σ∗1 =
 0 ifσ2 ≤ α1
2
√
σ2 − α ifσ2 > α.
(3)
Analogously, the best response function Π (σ1) for firm 2 is:
σ∗2 =
 0 ifσ1 ≤ α1
2
√
σ1 − α ifσ1 > α.
(4)
These best response functions explain why we assumed that α ∈ [0, 1). Values of α < 0
imply that there is a unique static Nash equilibrium and that such an equilibrium has positive
search effort. Values of α ≥ 1 also yield a unique static Nash equilibrium, but now with zero
search effort. Only for α ∈ [0, 1) can we have multiple static Nash equilibria.
A static pure Nash equilibrium is a tuple {σ∗1, σ∗2} that is a fixed point of the product of
both best response functions (3) and (4) (we ignore mixed strategies equilibria; see Footnote 6;
also from here on, we will omit “static” when no ambiguity occurs). Clearly, for all α ∈ [0, 1),
{σ∗1, σ∗2}= {0, 0} is a Nash equilibrium. We call this case a passive equilibrium, where the
matching probability is 1/4, aggregate output y is 1/2, and consumption by the household c is
1/2.
Depending on the value of α, we might have one or two more equilibria in pure strategies
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with a positive search effort of σ∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 > 0. The matching probability is now given by
1 + 2σ∗ + (σ∗)2
4
,
gross aggregate output y by
1 + 2σ∗ + (σ∗)2
2
,
and consumption c by
1 + 2σ∗ + (σ∗)2
2
− 1 + α
2
σ∗ − 2
3
(σ∗)3 .
To derive c, we subtracted the search costs of both firms from output. We call equilibria with
positive search effort active.
Figure 1: Three cases of cost parameter α
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1
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
2
 = 0.05
Best response firm 2
Best response firm 1
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1
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Best response firm 2
Best response firm 1
Figure 1 draws three cases: α = 0.05 (panel on the left), α = 0.063 (central panel), and
α = 0.07 (panel on the right). The dashed line plots the best response function of firm 1,
the solid line the best response function of firm 2, and the red circles each Nash equilibrium.
When α = 0.05, there are three Nash equilibria in pure strategies: σ∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0,
σ∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0.069, and σ
∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0.181. These equilibria are Pareto-ranked:
consumption (a welfare measure in our environment) is 0.5 in the first equilibrium, 0.535 in the
second equilibrium, and 0.598 in the third equilibrium. When α = 0.063, there are two Nash
equilibria in pure strategies: σ∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0, and σ
∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0.126. Again, the equilibria
are Pareto-ranked, with consumption in the active equilibrium equal to 0.565. When α = 0.07,
the only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is passive, σ∗ = σ∗1 = σ
∗
2 = 0.
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2.3 Stochastic shocks
To generate additional results beyond the multiplicity of equilibria, we introduce stochastic
shocks in the production function of matched firms. Instead of jointly producing 2 units of
output, as in the baseline case, we now assume that firms produce 2zt, where zt is a productivity
shock in period t (we now index variables by t, but because of symmetry, there is no need to
index them by the island). Productivity shocks will induce movements in the economy along
one Nash equilibrium and, sometimes, changes among the Nash equilibria firms play.
The new expected profit function of firm 1 is:
J (σ1,t, σ2,t, zt) = zt
1 + σ1,t + σ2,t + σ1,tσ2,t
4
− 1 + α
4
σ1,t −
σ31,t
3
.
Following the same reasoning as in the deterministic case, the best response function Π (σ2,t, zt)
for firm 1 is:
σ∗1,t =
 0 if zt (1 + σ2,t) ≤ (1 + α)1
2
√
zt (1 + σ2,t)− (1 + α) if zt (1 + σ2,t) > (1 + α) ,
(5)
and the best response function Π (σ1,t, zt) for firm 2 is:
σ∗2,t =
 0 if zt (1 + σ1,t) ≤ (1 + α)1
2
√
zt (1 + σ1,t)− (1 + α) if zt (1 + σ1,t) > (1 + α) .
(6)
When zt = 1, equations (5) and (6) collapse to equations (3) and (4).
A static pure Nash equilibrium is a tuple
{
σ∗1,t, σ
∗
2,t
}
that is a fixed point of the product of
both of the best response functions (5) and (6). As before, we can have one, two, or three Nash
equilibria with matching probability given by
1 + 2σ∗t + (σ
∗
t )
2
4
,
gross aggregate output yt by
zt
1 + 2σ∗t + (σ
∗
t )
2
2
,
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and consumption ct by
zt
1 + 2σ∗t + (σ
∗
t )
2
2
− 1 + α
2
σ∗t −
2
3
(σ∗t )
3 .
To illustrate the behavior of our economy, we fix α = 0.063 and assume that zt follows a
Markov chain with support {0.93, 1, 1.07}. Since the values of the transition matrix for this chain
will not matter for the next few paragraphs, we momentarily defer its specification. We pick the
average value of zt to be 1 to make the stochastic model coincide, for that realization, with the
deterministic environment. The value of α = 0.063 ensures that, when zt = 1, there is only one
active Nash equilibrium. We pick the high realization of zt to be 1.07 to get zt > 1 + α. When
this condition holds, zero search effort is not a Nash equilibrium. We pick the low realization
0.93 for symmetry.
Figure 2: Changing productivity zt
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Figure 2 plots the best response functions under each realization of productivity. The left
panel shows in solid lines the best responses for zt = 1 (with crosses for the best response of firm
2). These are the same as those drawn in the central panel of Figure 1 and show two fixed points:
one with σ∗t = σ
∗
1,t = σ
∗
2,t = 0, and one with σ
∗
t = σ
∗
1,t = σ
∗
2,t = 0.126. Consumption in the first
equilibrium is 0.5 and 0.565 in the second equilibrium, even if productivity remains the same.
The dashed lines in the same panel are the best responses when zt = 1.07 (with crosses for the
best response of firm 2). Now we have a unique Nash equilibrium at σ∗t = σ
∗
1,t = σ
∗
2,t = 0.274 (the
green circle), with consumption at 0.709. The right panel plots in solid lines the best responses
for zt = 1, with the same explanation as above. The dashed lines now draw the best responses
for zt = 0.93, with a unique Nash equilibrium at σ
∗
t = σ
∗
1,t = σ
∗
2,t = 0 and consumption at 0.465.
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Figure 2 illustrates how consumption usually moves more than productivity. For example,
consumption increases 27% when the economy starts at the passive equilibrium and zt moves
from 1.0 to 1.07. This amplification mechanism comes from search complementarities: when
firm 1 searches more because productivity is higher, firm 2 increases its search effort in response
to the higher search effort of firm 1 (and vice versa).
Indeed, in our model, the multiplier |∆ct/ct
∆zt/zt
| of consumption to a productivity shock is state-
dependent: the same productivity shock leads to different changes in consumption depending
on the state of the economy. Table 1 documents this point by reporting the multiplier in six
relevant cases (and where subindexes denote the productivity level and type of equilibria). The
multiplier ranges from as low as 1 –when the economy moves from low productivity to mean
productivity, as search effort is zero in both cases– to nearly 6 –when the economy moves from
mean productivity and zero search effort to high productivity.
Table 1: Multiplier
Productivity shock |∆ct/ct
∆zt/zt
|
zlow → zmean,passive 1
zlow → zhigh 3.485
zmean,passive → zhigh 5.969
zmean,active → zhigh 3.627
zhigh → zlow 4.009
zhigh → zmean,active 3.095
Our last task is to specify a transition matrix Π for productivity shocks. We select a standard
business cycle parameterization with symmetry and medium persistence:
Π =

0.90 0.08 0.02
0.05 0.90 0.05
0.02 0.08 0.90
 .
When zt is high or low, the Nash equilibrium is unique. When zt = 1, there are two Nash
equilibria, and we select between them through history dependence following Cooper (1994).
More concretely, if the economy was in a passive equilibrium in the previous period, we stay
in such an equilibrium today. Conversely, if the economy was in an active equilibrium in the
previous period, firms continue searching with positive effort today.
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Our equilibrium selection has two implications. First, the effects of a productivity shock
persist longer than the shock. In particular, the economy cannot move directly from zlow to
zmean,active or from zhigh to zmean,passive (this explains why Table 1 does not report these cases).
Instead, to switch equilibria, the economy must transition through an intermediate stage of high
productivity (when we start from zt = 0.93) or low productivity (when we start from zt = 1.07).
Second, we do not generate fluctuations through sunspots. Changes among Nash equilibria in
our economy always derive from the movement in fundamentals.
Figure 3: Simulation of aggregate consumption
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Figure 3 shows a typical realization of consumption for 1,000 periods. Consumption takes
four different values: 0.465 (zt = 0.93), 0.5 (zt = 1.0, passive equilibrium), 0.565 (zt = 1.0, active
equilibrium), and 0.709 (zt = 1.07). Given Π, the stationary distribution of productivity is
(0.278, 0.444, 0.278). Since our simulations start from zt = 1.0 (and an active equilibrium), we
have a slightly higher level of mean realizations of productivity, with a count of (233, 490, 277).
Consumption is 0.465 in 233 periods and 0.552 in 277 periods. More interesting is the breakdown
of the 490 periods when zt = 1.0: 180 happen in a passive equilibrium and 310 in an active
equilibrium. Asymptotically, due to the symmetry of Π, the realizations of zmean will split evenly
between both levels of consumption.
The simple model has illustrated four points. First, search complementarities create multiple
Nash equilibria. Second, the interaction of search complementarities with stochastic shocks
amplifies the impact of the latter. Third, the multiplier of consumption to a productivity shock
is a highly non-linear function of the state of the economy and the size of the shock. Fourth,
history dependence enhances the persistence of aggregate variables to shocks. We move now
to show how these four key points appear as well in a fully fledged quantitative business cycle
model with search complementaries.
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3 A model with search complementarities in inter-firm
matching
We work with a search and matching model where time is discrete and infinite. The economy is
composed of households, firms in the intermediate-goods production sector (I), and firms in the
final-goods production sector (F ).
3.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of size 1. Households are risk neutral and discount the
future by βξt per period. This term is the product of a constant β < 1 and a discount factor
shock ξt. Innovations to ξt may encapsulate demographic shifts, movements in financial frictions,
or fluctuations in risk tolerance that we abstract from. Cochrane (2011) and Hall (2016, 2017)
have provided evidence for the importance of those shocks as a central source of aggregate
fluctuations. Since households own the firms, firms also employ βξt to discount future profits.
Households can either work one unit of time per period for a wage w or be unemployed and
receive h utils of home production and leisure. Households do not have preferences for working
–or searching for a job– in either sector i ∈ {I, F}. Households also receive the aggregate profits
of all firms.
3.2 Labor matching
At the beginning of each period t, any willing new firm can post a vacancy in either sector at the
cost of χ per period to hire job-seeking households. Each firm posts a vacancy for one worker.
Vacancies and job seekers meet in a DMP frictional labor market.
Given ui,t unemployed households and vi,t posted vacancies in sector i, a constant-return-
to-scale matching technology m(ui,t, vi,t) determines the number of hires and vacancies filled
in period t. The new hires start working in period t+ 1. The job-finding rate for unemployed
households, µi,t = m(ui,t, vi,t)/ui,t = µ(θi,t), and the probability of filling a vacancy, qi,t =
m(ui,t, vi,t)/vi,t = q(θi,t), are functions of each sector’s labor market tightness ratio θi,t = vi,t/ui,t.
Then, µ′(θi,t) > 0 and q′(θi,t) < 0: in a tighter labor market, unemployed households are more
likely to find a job, and firms are less likely to fill vacancies.
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At the end of each period t, already existing jobs terminate at a rate δ and unfilled vacancies
expire. We assume that 50% of the newly unemployed workers are assigned to search in each
sector. To simplify the model, once an unemployed worker is assigned to search in one sector, it is
not allowed to move to search in another sector (given the symmetry of our model across sectors
and our calibration below, workers do not mind this restriction). Appealing to an appropriate
law of large numbers, unemployment evolves as:
ut+1 = ut − [µI (θI,t)uI,t + µF (θF,t)uF,t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Job creation
+ δ (1− ut)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Job destruction
(7)
where ut = uI,t + uF,t. Equation (7) shows how unemployment is determined by changes in job
creation that depend on sectoral labor market tightness, θi,t.
Note that our DMP block is standard. More concretely, we do not include search comple-
mentarities on it. The only role of the DMP block is to provide us with a natural framework to
discuss unemployment and vacancies without unduly complicating the rest of the model.
3.3 Inter-firm matching
Once job vacancies are filled, a final-goods firm must form a joint venture with an intermediate-
goods firm to manufacture together, starting in t+ 1, the final goods sold to households. This
final good is also the numeraire in the economy. If a firm fails to form a joint venture in period
t, it produces no output and continues searching for a partner in t+ 1. This stylized matching
problem summarizes more sophisticated inter-firm network structures such as those in Jones
(2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2012) and that we motivated in the introduction.
A technology with variable search effort governs inter-firm matching. Search effort is costly,
but it reduces the expected duration of remaining a single firm unable to produce. At the end of
each period, a constant fraction of already existing joint ventures are destroyed because either
the job is destroyed with probability δ, or the joint venture fails at a rate δ˜.3 In the former case,
the firms dissolve. In the latter case, the firms revert to their status as single firms, but the jobs
survive.
3To simplify the algebra, we assume that, in a joint venture, the jobs in the intermediate-goods firm and the
final-goods firm terminate simultaneously with probability δ or survive simultaneously with probability 1− δ. In
single firms, the job destruction rate is also δ. Also, we assume that δ + δ˜ < 1, and that the separation of job
matches and joint ventures is a mutually exclusive event.
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Figure 4: Timeline of firms’ evolution
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The actions of these firms, summarized in Figure 4, require more explanation. In a joint
venture, the intermediate-goods firm uses its worker to produce yI,t = zt, where zt is the
stochastic productivity in the intermediate-goods sector. The final-goods firm takes this yI,t
and, employing its worker, transforms it one-to-one into the final good, yF,t = yI,t = zt.
Extending the search effort model in Burdett and Mortensen (1980), we assume that the
number of inter-firm matches is M (n˜F,t, n˜I,t, ηF,t, ηI,t) = (φ+ ηF,tηI,t)H (n˜F,t, n˜I,t), where n˜F,t
is the number of single firms in sector F with search effort, ηF,t; n˜I,t and ηI,t are the analogous
variables for the I sector. The parameter φ > 0 represents the efficiency in matching unrelated
to search effort and it will help us to replicate the average inter-firm matching probabilities in
the data. The function H (·) has constant returns to scale and it is strictly increasing in both
search efforts. We set up its units by choosing H (1, 1) = 1. Variable search effort generates
strategic complementarities in the sense of Bulow et al. (1985) since the degree of optimal search
effort by one firm will be (weakly) increasing in the number of firms searching in the opposite
sector and their search effort.
Given the inter-firm market tightness ratio n˜F/n˜I , the probability that a sector I firm will
form a joint venture with a sector F firm is:
piI =
M (n˜F , n˜I , ηF , ηI)
n˜I
= (φ+ ηFηI)H
(
n˜F,t
n˜I,t
, 1
)
, (8)
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and the probability that a sector F firm will form a joint venture with a sector I firm is:
piF =
M (n˜F , n˜I , ηF , ηI)
n˜F
= (φ+ ηFηI)H
(
1,
n˜I,t
n˜F,t
)
. (9)
Search effort in sector i is given by a fixed component, ψ > 0, and a variable component,
σi,t ≥ 0:
ηi,t = ψ + σi,t. (10)
The fixed component ψ guarantees that the marginal return to searching does not become zero
when prospective partners search with zero effort. In comparison, each firm optimally chooses
σi,t ≥ 0 (we will focus on symmetric equilibria where all firms within one sector make the same
choice) to trade off search cost and the profits from matching success.
The cost of σi,t is:
c (σi,t) = c0σi,t + c1
σ1+νi,t
1 + ν
, (11)
where c0 > 0 creates a linear cost tranche and {c1, ν} > 0 a convex cost tranche.4 The linear
cost implies that the net gain from searching can be negative, in which case the firm chooses
σi = 0. This assumption is critical. If c0 = 0, the benefit from an additional unit of search effort
is always positive, and the firm chooses σi > 0 in all states of the economy. Instead, c0 > 0
generates the non-convexity that triggers, as we will see, multiple equilibria.
In a symmetric equilibrium, the two sectors have the same number of single firms (n˜F,t = n˜I,t)
and variable search effort (σF,t = σI,t). Thus, the inter-firm matching probability is:
piF,t = piI,t = φ+ ηF,tηI,t = φ+ (ψ + σF,t) (ψ + σI,t) . (12)
The parameter ψ determines the impact of the variable search effort in the opposite sector for
the matching probability because of the product ηFηI in equation (12), while φ > 0 does not.
This will give us, in our calibration in Section 5, identification for piF,t and piI,t.
5
The number of joint ventures in period t+ 1 comprises firms that survive job separation and
4The cost function (2) in our model in Section 2 follows equation (11) when c0 =
1+α
4 , c1 = 1, and ν = 2.
5The matching probability (1) in our model in Section 2 is nearly the same as the matching probability in
equation (12) when φ = 316 and ψ =
1
4 , except for a term
1
4 missing in front of σI,tσF,t, which we introduced
in the simple model to ensure that the matching probability was always between (0, 1). Note, also, a subtle
difference between the two economies: in the simple model, we have a strategic complementarity between two
firms in each island; in the complete model, the strategic complementarity is among a continuum of firms.
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joint venture destruction plus newly formed joint ventures:
nt+1 = (1− δ − δ˜)nt + (φ+ (ψ + σF,t) (ψ + σI,t))n˜I,t. (13)
The number of single firms in sector i in period t+ 1 includes firms that survive job separation
((1− δ) n˜i,t), newly created single firms whose vacancies are filled by job-seekers (µi (θi,t) · ui,t),
and firms whose joint ventures exogenously terminate (δ˜ni,t), net of the number of single firms
that form joint ventures (pii,tn˜i,t):
n˜i,t+1 = (1− δ) n˜i,t + µi (θi,t)ui,t + δ˜ni,t − pii,tn˜i,t. (14)
We will prove below that search complementarities beget multiple static equilibria. As in
Section 2, one of these equilibria is passive, with σI,t = σF,t = 0, low production, and high
unemployment. The other equilibria are active, with (σI,t, σF,t) > 0, high production, and low
unemployment. Also, as in Section 2, the selection of static equilibria is history dependent.
Sufficiently large shocks to productivity or the discount factor induce firms to adjust search
effort, and the economy shifts from one equilibrium to the other. Otherwise, the economy stays
in the same equilibrium as in the previous period.
Since we require notation to keep track of those equilibria, we specify an indicator function,
ιt, with value 0 if the static equilibrium is passive and 1 if active. This indicator function is
taken as given by all agents.6
3.4 Values of households and firms
We can now define the Bellman equations that determine the value, for each sector i, of an
unemployed household (Ui,t), of an employed household in a single firm (W˜i,t) and in a joint
venture (Wi,t), of a filled job in a single firm (J˜i,t) and in a joint venture (Ji,t), and of a vacant job
(Vi,t). We index all of these value functions by ιt since they depend on the type of equilibrium
6There might exist a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which firms search with positive variable effort with
a certain probability. However, Appendix E shows the mixed-strategy is not robust: when one sector changes
the probability slightly due to a trembling-hand perturbation, the opposite sector would immediately set the
probability to either zero or one. Therefore, we forget about these mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for the rest of
the paper. We will also ignore non-Markov strategies, limit cycles, and alternative equilibria selection devices
and leave them for future investigation.
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at t, which affects the future path of the equilibrium and the match value.
The value of an unemployed household in sector i and equilibrium ι is:
Ui,t|ιt = h+ βξtEt
[
µi,tW˜i,t+1 + (1− µi,t)Ui,t+1 | ιt
]
. (15)
In the current period, the unemployed household receives a payment h. The household finds a
job with probability µi,t and circulates into employment during the next period, or it fails to
find employment with probability 1− µi,t and remains unemployed.
The value of a household with a job in a single firm in sector i is:
W˜i,t|ιt = w˜i,t + βξtEt
{
(1− δ)
[
pii,tWi,t+1 + (1− pii,t) W˜i,t+1
]
+ δUi,t+1 | ιt
}
. (16)
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) is the period wage w˜i,t (to be determined below by
Nash bargaining). In period t+ 1, the match that survives job destruction may either form a
joint venture with a firm in the opposite sector with probability pii,t, gaining the value Wi,t+1, or
otherwise remain a single firm with probability 1− pii,t, with value W˜i,t+1. With probability δ,
the job is destroyed, and the household transitions into unemployment.
The value of a household with a job in a joint venture in each sector i is:
Wi,t|ιt = wi,t + βξtEt
[
(1− δ − δ˜)Wi,t+1 + δ˜W˜i,t+1 + δUi,t+1 | ιt
]
. (17)
A worker in a joint venture receives the wage wi,t. In period t+1, the worker becomes unemployed
with probability δ, gaining the value Ui,t+1. With probability δ˜, the joint venture is terminated,
and the value becomes W˜i,t+1. Otherwise, the match continues, gaining the value Wi,t+1.
The value of a single firm in sector i is:
J˜i,t|ιt = max
σi,t≥0
{
−w˜i,t − c (σi,t) + β (1− δ) ξtEt
[
pii,tJi,t+1 + (1− pii,t) J˜i,t+1 | ιt
]}
. (18)
Equation (18) tells us that single firms have zero revenues until they form a joint venture with a
firm in the opposite sector. Despite zero production, the firm pays the wage (w˜i,t) and incurs
search costs c (σi,t), as described in equation (11). In period t+ 1, conditional on surviving job
destruction with probability 1− δ, the firm forms a joint venture with probability pii,t given by
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equation (12), gaining the flow value Ji,t+1. Otherwise, the firm remains single with flow value
J˜i,t+1. If the job is destroyed, the firm exits the market with zero value.
The value of a joint venture for a sector I firm is:
JI,t|ιt = ztpt − wI,t + βξtEt
[
(1− δ − δ˜)JI,t+1 + δ˜J˜I,t+1 | ιt
]
. (19)
This profit comprises revenues ztpt from selling intermediate goods to the final-goods firm, net
of the wage wI,t. Both pt and wI,t are determined by Nash bargaining. In period t + 1, with
probability δ˜, the firm is separated from its partner and becomes a single firm, gaining a value
of J˜I,t+1; with probability δ, the job match is destroyed, and the firm exits the market with zero
value. Otherwise the joint venture continues with flow value Ji,t+1.
The value of a joint venture for a sector F firm is:
JF,t|ιt = zt(1− pt)− wF,t + βξtEt
[
(1− δ − δ˜)JF,t+1 + δ˜J˜F,t+1 | ιt
]
. (20)
The profit for the joint venture in the final-goods sector comprises revenues from selling zt units
of final goods at a unitary price, net of the costs of purchasing intermediate goods (ztpt) and
paying the wage (wF,t). The rest of the equation follows the same interpretation as equation
(19).
The value of a vacant job in sector i is:
Vi,t|ιt = −χ+ βξtEt
[
q (θi,t) J˜i,t+1 + (1− q (θi,t)) max (0, VI,t+1, VF,t+1) | ιt
]
. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the value of a vacant job comprises the fixed cost of posting a vacancy
χ in period t. With probability q
(
θi,t|ιt
)
, the vacancy is filled, and a single firm with flow value
J˜i,t+1 is created. Otherwise, the vacancy remains open, generating the flow value of Vi,t+1. The
last term in the equation shows that firms that fail to recruit a worker may choose to be inactive
or post a vacancy in either sector in the next period t+ 1.
Due to free-entry by firms, we have Vi,t = 0 and the condition that pins down labor market
tightness:
χ = βξtEt
[
q (θi,t) J˜i,t+1 | ιt
]
. (22)
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3.5 Wages and prices
We can now define the Nash bargaining rules that determine wages and prices. During each
period t, wages are pinned down by Nash bargaining between firms in joint ventures and workers:
max
wi,t
(Wi,t − Ui,t)1−τJτi,t (23)
and between single firms and workers:
max
w˜i,t
(W˜i,t − Ui,t)1−τ J˜τi,t, (24)
where the parameter τ ∈ [0, 1] is the firm’s bargaining power.
The price for goods manufactured in the intermediate-goods sector is determined by Nash
bargaining between the final-goods producer and the intermediate-goods producer within the
joint venture:
max
pt
(JF,t − J˜F,t)1−τ˜ (JI,t − J˜I,t)τ˜ , (25)
where the parameter τ˜ ∈ [0, 1] is the intermediate-goods producer’s bargaining power.
3.6 Stochastic processes and aggregate resource constraint
The discount factor shock, ξt, has a log-normal i.i.d. distribution, log (ξt) ∼ N
(
0, σ2ξ
)
. This
shock is not persistent over time. In this way, we can show that the propagation mechanism
created by ξt is, in its entirety, a combination of endogenous forces and history dependence
(although introducing persistence in the shock would be straightforward). Productivity follows
log (zt+1) = ρz log (zt) + σzz,t+1, where ρz ≤ 1.
The total resources of the economy, equal to ztnt (i.e., production per joint venture times
the number of existing joint ventures; h is in util terms and, thus, fails to appear here), are used
for aggregate consumption by households, ct, and to pay for vacancies and inter-firm search:
ct +
∑
i=I,F
χvi,t +
∑
i=I,F
n˜i,t
(
c0σi,t + c1
σ1+νi,t
1 + ν
)
= ztnt. (26)
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4 Equilibrium
A recursive, symmetric equilibrium of type ιt for our economy is a collection of Bellman equations
Ui,t, W˜i,t, Wi,t, J˜i,t, Ji,t, and Vi,t, a variable search effort σi,t, and sequences for unemployment
ut, single firms n˜i,t, joint ventures nt, the price of the intermediate good pt, and wages w˜i,t and
wi,t, all for i ∈ {I, F}, such that:
1. Ui,t, W˜i,t, Wi,t, J˜i,t, Ji,t, and Vi,t satisfy equations (15)-(21).
2. The free-entry condition Vi,t = 0 holds.
3. σi,t maximizes the asset value of the single firm J˜i,t.
4. The sequences of unemployment ut, single firms n˜i,t, and joint ventures nt follow the laws
of motion in equations (7), (14), and (13), respectively.
5. The intermediate-goods price pt and the wage for single and joint ventures, w˜i,t and wi,t,
respectively, are determined by the Nash bargaining equations (23)-(25).
6. The type of equilibrium ιt is consistent with σi,t.
7. ξt and zt follow their stochastic processes.
8. The aggregate resource constraint (26) is satisfied.
We can use this definition to characterize the optimal search strategy of firms and show the
existence of multiple static equilibria.
4.1 Optimal search effort
Following condition 3 above, the optimal σi,t maximizes the value of the single firm, J˜i,t. We
can express this value function as a response function to σj,t given an equilibrium ιt:
Πi (σi,t | σj,t, ιt) = −w˜i,t − c (σi,t) + βξt (1− δ)Et
[
pii,t(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1) + J˜i,t+1 | ιt
]
. (27)
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A single firm i chooses σi,t to maximize Πi (σi,t | σj,t, ιt). The interior solution σi,t > 0 satisfies:
c0 + c1σ
ν
i,t = β˜ (ψ + σj,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Search effort in sector j
ξt︸︷︷︸
discount factor shock
Et
(
Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected capital gain
(28)
where β˜ = β (1− δ) /τ (the wage Nash bargaining implies that the firm bears τ fraction of
the search cost). The left-hand side (LHS) of equation (28) is the marginal cost of exerting
σi,t to build a joint venture in sector i, while the RHS is the expected benefit of searching
for a partner, which increases with σj,t, and the expected capital gain from entering into a
joint venture, Et(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt) times ξt. The expected capital gains depend positively on
zt. Hence, condition (27) shows how higher ξt or zt (fundamentals) and higher σi,t (search
complementarities) lead to higher σi,t.
Because the optimization problem is non-convex, we also have a corner solution σi,t = 0,
either because the firms in the other sector search too little or because the discounted expected
gains from matching are too small. The next proposition summarizes this argument.
Proposition 1. The optimal σi,t is equal to:
σi,t =

[
β˜(ψ+σj,t)ξtEt(Ji,t+1−J˜i,t+1|ιt)−c0
c1
] 1
ν
if β˜ (ψ + σj,t) ξtEt
(
Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt
)
> c0
0 otherwise.
(29)
Proposition 1 establishes why search complementarities beget a multiplicity of equilibria
(this proposition follows directly from equation (28); the proofs of the other propositions and
lemmas in this subsection appear in Appendix C). Sufficiently large shocks to either ξt or zt
move the system between interior and corner solutions, generating alternate business cycle
phases with robust search effort, a large number of joint ventures, and low unemployment with
phases marked by no search effort, few joint ventures, and high unemployment. The parameter
c0 determines whether σi,t > 0 while c1 controls the marginal cost of search.
Figure 5 illustrates Proposition 1 by plotting the optimal search effort σF of a firm in the
final-goods sector as the best response to the search effort of firms in the intermediate-goods
sector σI . The red circle shows the best response in the passive equilibrium when search effort
in the intermediate-goods sector is zero. The solid line shows the best response in the active
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equilibrium with positive search effort. Here and in the rest of this section, we calibrate the
model using the parameter values described in Section 5.7
Figure 5: Best response function for firm in the final-goods sector
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Note: The figure shows the best response function in the final-goods sector conditional on the active
equilibrium (ι = 1, solid line) and on the passive equilibrium (ι = 0, circle marker).
Two lessons emerge from Figure 5. First, the active equilibrium with positive search effort
involves search complementarities. The upward sloping optimal response curve shows that the
final-goods producing firm (weakly) increases its search effort when the firm in the intermediate-
goods sector increases its own search effort. Second, the optimal search effort for the final-goods
firm remains equal to zero for values of σI below 0.05. In such a region, the marginal cost of
forming a joint venture is larger than the benefit of the joint venture and, thus, final-goods
producing firms choose σF = 0.
4.2 The deterministic steady states of the model
We study now the existence and stability properties of the deterministic steady states (DSSs) of
the model that appear when we shut down the shocks ξt and zt by making them constant and
equal to their mean values (both equal to 1). The model encompasses two types of DSSs: a
passive DSS with zero search effort (σI = σF = 0) and active DSSs with positive search effort
(σI > 0, σF > 0). The level of economic activity is different across DSSs.
7Also, we use the expected capital gain in the stable and active deterministic steady state (DSS) when
computing the best response curve in the active equilibrium. Analogously, we use the expected capital gain in the
passive DSS when computing the best response in the passive equilibrium. We will follow the same assumptions
in Figure 8 below.
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Proposition 2. The level of output is strictly lower and the unemployment rate is strictly higher
in a passive DSS than in an active DSS.
Intuitively, zero search effort in the passive DSS implies few joint ventures and low production.
A small probability of forming a joint venture reduces the value of a single firm and generates a
fall in posted vacancies and an increase in unemployment.
The next two propositions establish conditions for the existence of the different DSSs.
Proposition 3. The passive DSS exists if and only if
β˜ψ
2− 2β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) (φ+ ψ2)
] < c0. (30)
Proposition 3 states that the passive DSS exists for any sufficiently large value of c0—that is,
when the benefit from an additional unit of search effort is lower than the cost associated with
it. In such a case, σI = σF = 0. The critical cost for the existence of the passive DSS is c0. In
comparison, c1 does not appear in Proposition 3.
Proposition 4. An active DSS exists if and only if there exists σ ∈ (0,√1− φ− ψ) that solves
β˜ (ψ + σ)
1 +
(
c0σ + c1
σ1+ν
1+ν
)
2− 2β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) (φ+ (σ + ψ)2)] = c0 + c1σν . (31)
The LHS of equation (31) captures the marginal gain of searching with positive effort in
the active equilibrium. The RHS reflects the marginal cost of searching. In the active DSS,
both quantities must be equal. Proposition 4 defines the parameter values that guarantee the
existence of the active DSS. The restriction σ ∈ (0,√1− φ− ψ) ensures that the matching
probability φ+ (ψ + σI)(ψ + σF ) is within (0,1).
Proposition 5. The active and passive DSSs coexist if and only if equations (30) and (31) hold
simultaneously.
Equations (30) and (31) can hold simultaneously, since they depend on different parameter
combinations. The passive DSS characterized by equation (30) is uniquely pinned down when
σI = σF = 0. In comparison, the system allows for multiple active DSSs, since equation (31) can
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hold for different symmetric (σI,t, σF,t) > 0. When the best response function is strictly concave
(i.e., ν > 1), the system admits, at most, two DSSs (if ν < 1, we would only have one active and
unstable equilibrium). The argument is formalized in the lemma below.
Lemma 1. The system has a unique passive DSS and at most two active DSSs.
Figure 6: Existence of DSSs
(a) Passive DSS
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(c) Two active DSS
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(d) Coexistence of passive and at
least one active DSS
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(e) Coexistence of passive and two
active DSSs
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
c0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
c 1
Figure 6 illustrates, for a range of values of c0 (x-axes) and c1 (y-axes), the conditions for the
existence of a passive DSS, an active DSS, and the coexistence of DSSs (the computation of the
DSS is described in Appendix B). The yellow-shaded area shows the combination of c0 and c1
values that guarantee the existence of such a DSS, while the blue area shows the non-existence
region. Panel (a) shows, as stated in Proposition 3, that sufficiently large values of c0 –in this
case c0 ≥ 0.28– that the passive DSS exists irrespective of c1. Panel (b) demonstrates that the
active DSS exists for sufficiently low values of c0. An increase in the value of c1 has two opposing
effects. On the one hand, it increases the cost of σi,t and, on the other hand, it decreases the
value of remaining a single firm, which raises the relative value of forming a joint venture. If the
second effect dominates, a large c1 expands the range of values of c0 that satisfy Proposition 4.
Panel (c) shows that two active DSSs exist when c1 is sufficiently large. Panel (d) combines
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panel (a) and panel (b) to draw the values for c0 and c1 that support the coexistence of passive
and active DSSs. Lastly, panel (e) plots the values of c0 and c1 that allow for the coexistence of
a passive and two active DSSs.
The next proposition establishes the stability of the DSSs. This stability guarantees that
a slight deviation of a subset of firms from their best response will fail to cause the system to
deviate from the initial DSS permanently.
Proposition 6. Suppose the active and passive DSSs coexist. The passive DSS is stable. When
two active DSSs coexist, one DSS is stable and the other DSS is unstable. When only one active
DSS exists, it is unstable.
For the remainder of the analysis, we mainly focus on stable DSSs. Also, we can study
the transition path from an arbitrary point in the state space of the system to the DSS. The
endogenous state variables of the system are the unemployment rates (uI,t, uF,t), the measure
of single firms (n˜I,t, n˜F,t), the measure of firms in joint ventures (nI,t, nF,t), and the current
equilibrium (ιt). Knowledge of n˜i,t and ui,t gives us ni,t = 1− n˜i,t − ui,t.
Figure 7: Transition path to the DSS
(a) Initial passive equilibrium
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(b) Initial active equilibrium
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Figure 7 shows the transition path of the system to the DSS for different initial values of the
unemployment rate (x-axes) and the measure of single firms (y-axes). Since we consider the
case of a symmetric economy, the analysis is representative of each sector. Panel (a) shows the
transition path to the DSS when the system starts from a passive equilibrium (with each red dot
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representing a DSS of the system). Given the history dependence of the equilibrium selection,
the system remains in the passive equilibrium and converges to the passive DSS indicated by
the higher red circle, where the unemployment rate is 8.7% and the measure of single firms is
22%. Analogously, panel (b) shows the system converges to the active and stable DSS, when it
starts from an active equilibrium. In the active DSS (the lower red dot), the unemployment rate
is 5.5%, and the measure of single firms is 12%.
4.3 Existence of two (stochastic) equilibria
Once we have characterized the DSSs of the model, we can reintroduce the shocks to the discount
factor and productivity. The following propositions characterize the conditions for the existence
of (stochastic) passive and active equilibria and their coexistence.
Proposition 7. The passive equilibrium exists if and only if
∂Πi (0|0, ιt = 0)
∂σi,t
≤ 0 for i = I, F (32)
or equivalently
c0 > β˜ψξtEt(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt = 0). (33)
Proposition 7 states that the passive equilibrium exists when the marginal benefit from
increasing search effort is negative. Equation (33) highlights that the existence of the passive
equilibrium requires either a low ξt or a small zt+1 (and, hence, a low Et(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt = 0)).
Proposition 8. The active equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a pair of positive search
efforts ({σI,tσF,t} > 0) that satisfies:
∂Πi (σi,t | σj,t, ιt = 1)
∂σI,t
= 0 for i = {I, F} (34)
or, equivalently,
c0 + c1σ
ν
i,t = β˜ (ψ + σj,t) ξtEt(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1 | ιt = 1), (35)
with (σI,t, σF,t) > 0 and the second derivatives of Πi are negative.
Proposition 8 states that an active equilibrium exists when the optimal response of the firm
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is to choose σi,t > 0 that satisfies equation (35). The next proposition states the condition for
the coexistence of the two static equilibria. History dependence selects between them.
Proposition 9. The active and passive equilibria coexist if and only if Propositions 7 and 8
hold simultaneously.
4.4 Transitional dynamics and ξt
To illustrate the properties of the deterministic transitional dynamics of the model, Figure 8
draws the phase diagram summarizing movements in search effort as a function of ξt (a similar
figure could be drawn for zt). The dashed line plots the passive equilibrium path with low search
effort and the solid line the active equilibrium path with high search effort. The arrows indicate
the direction of the transition dynamics for the endogenous variable to reach the basins of
attraction of the system, represented by point σp(1) for the passive DSS and σa(1) for the active
DSS. The shaded area indicates the range of values of ξt that support multiple static equilibria.
The passive equilibrium fails to exist for sufficiently large values of ξt and, conversely, the active
equilibrium fails to exist for sufficiently small values of ξt. In the absence of innovations to ξt,
the system converges and remains on the original basins of attraction in the passive equilibrium,
σp(1), and the active equilibrium, σa(1), depending on the starting equilibrium.
Figure 8: Phase diagram for search effort
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Temporary shifts to ξt, which are sufficiently strong to change search effort, move the system
to a new static equilibrium. For example, if the system starts in the passive equilibrium at point
A and a large and positive innovation to ξt moves the system to point B, the passive equilibrium
disappears, and the equilibrium of the system becomes active. The economy moves to the new
active equilibrium at point C, converging to the stationary basin of attraction σa(1) in the long
run. The system remains in the active equilibrium until a sufficiently negative innovation to ξt
returns the system to the passive equilibrium. For instance, a large negative innovation to ξt,
which moves the system from point C to point D, triggers the new passive equilibrium at point
E, converging to the stationary basin of attraction σp(1). In comparison, innovations to ξt that
move the equilibrium of the system within the shaded area, where both static equilibria coexist,
fail to shift the equilibrium because of history dependence.
5 Calibration
We calibrate the model at a monthly frequency for U.S. data over the post-WWII period. Table
2 summarizes the value and the source or target for each parameter.
Table 2: Parameter calibration
Parameter Value Source or Target
β 0.996 5% annual risk-free rate
α 0.4 Shimer (2005)
τ 0.4 Hosios condition
χ 0.28 0.45 monthly job-finding rate
κ 1.25 den Haan et al. (2000)
h 0.3 Thomas and Zanetti (2009)
τ˜ 0.5 Sectoral symmetry
δ 0.027 5.5% unemployment rate in active DSS
δ˜ 0.021 4 years’ duration of joint venture
φ 0.135 22% rate of idleness in recessions
ψ 0.114 Condition of Propositions 3 and 4 and 15% recession periods
c0 0.33 Condition of Propositions 3 and 4 and 15% recession periods
c1 5 12% rate of idleness in booms
ν 2 Ensure concavity of best response function
σξ 0.05 Justiniano and Primiceri (2008)
ρz 0.95
1/3 BLS
σz 0.008 BLS
The constant β is set to 0.996 (equivalent to 0.99 at a quarterly frequency) to replicate an
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average annual interest rate of 5% over the sample period. In keeping the DMP block of the
model as standard as possible, we assume a Cobb-Douglas matching function m(u, v) = u1−αvα
in the labor market and calibrate the elasticity of vacancies in the matching function α = 0.4,
the average value estimated in the literature (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). We set the
wage bargaining power equal to τ = α = 0.4, which satisfies the Hosios (1990) condition. We
follow den Haan et al. (2000) in selecting the inter-firm matching function:
H (n˜F , n˜I) =
n˜F · n˜I
(n˜κF/2 + n˜
κ
I/2)
1/κ
. (36)
The advantage of this functional form is that it ensures that matching probabilities are always
between 0 and 1 without introducing truncations (as often happens with Cobb-Douglas matching
functions). Also, after den Haan et al. (2000), we set κ = 1.25.
We pick the cost of posting a vacancy χ = 0.28 to match the monthly job-finding rate
in the active DSS, µ (θ) = 0.45, as in Shimer (2005). Conditional on χ = 0.28, we select a
job-separation rate δ = 0.027 to match an unemployment rate of 5.5% in the active DSS. The
flow value of unemployment h is set at 0.3, which consists of the value of leisure and home
production and the unemployment benefit, as in Thomas and Zanetti (2009). In this calibration,
the flow value of unemployment is about 61% of the average wage in the active DSS, which is in
the range of replacement rates documented by Hall and Milgrom (2008).
Compared to a standard DMP economy, our model includes seven new parameters: τ˜ , δ˜, φ,
ψ, c0, c1, and ν. The bargaining share of the intermediate-goods firm τ˜ is set to 0.5, to evenly
split the total surplus from matching between firms and make the workers indifferent between
working in either sector. The rate of termination of inter-firm matches δ˜ is 0.021 to replicate the
4 years’ average duration of a match. As shown in Figure 9, the median and the mean of the
duration of inter-firm matches are around 4 years in the Compustat Customer Segment data,
which reports the major customers for a subset of U.S. listed companies on a yearly basis.
Once we have set values for the previous parameters, c1 and φ pin down the measure of
single firms in the active DSS and passive DSS, respectively. The ratio of the measure of single
firms to employment corresponds to the rate of idleness, indicating the share of time when
employed workers are idle due to a lack of activity (Michaillat and Saez, 2015). The Institute for
Supply Management constructs the operating rates (one minus the rate of idleness) in the U.S.
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Figure 9: The distribution of the inter-firm trading relationship duration
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According to its measurements, the rate of idleness is about 30% for the non-manufacturing
sector and 20% for the manufacturing sector during the Great Recession, and 12% for both
sectors before this event. Thus, we set φ = 0.135 and c1 = 5 to yield a rate of idleness equal to
0.22 and 0.12 in the passive DSS and the active DSS, respectively. Finally, ν = 2 ensures the
concavity of the best response function of search effort.
There is no direct empirical guidance for the calibration of c0 and ψ. We calibrate them as
0.33 and 0.114, respectively, to satisfy the conditions for the coexistence of passive and active
DSSs in Proposition 5. Our calibration of c0 and c1 implies that search cost is about 2% of
output. This value is consistent with the fact that 2.5% of workers are employed in search-related
occupations (see Subsection 7.1 for our measure of search-related employment).
We set σξ to 0.05.
8 Such a value, given the rest of the calibration, generates a passive
equilibrium with 15% probability, consistent with the frequency of recessions in the post-WWII
U.S. The persistence of the productivity shock, ρz, is set to 0.88
1/3 to match the observed
quarterly autocorrelation of 0.88, and the standard deviation, σz, is set to 0.0057 to match the
quarterly standard deviation of 0.02, as in Shimer (2005).
Once the model is calibrated, we compute the different value functions using value function
iteration and exploit the equilibrium conditions of the model to find all variables of interest. See
Appendices A and D for technical details.
8Justiniano and Primiceri (2008, Table 1) find a quarterly σξ = 3.13%, with a persistence of 0.84. This
implies that σξ = 0.0313/
√
1− 0.842 = 0.0577. If we extrapolate the quarterly AR(1) process to a monthly
AR(1) process, the implied standard deviation is about 0.056. To be on the conservative side, we round down to
0.05.
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6 Quantitative analysis
To study the dynamic properties of the model, we simulate it for 3,000,000 months and time-
average the resulting variables to generate quarterly data. We start the simulation from the
active DSS, focusing on the case when only discount factor shocks are present. Appendix F
provides a quantitative analysis of properties of the model with productivity shocks. We relegate
that case to the appendix because productivity shocks of plausible magnitude are unable to
move the system between different equilibria, unless those shocks are permanent.
Figure 10: Simulated variables for the first 100 periods with shocks to ξt
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Figure 10 reports the responses of key variables to shocks to ξt for the first 100 periods. The
economy begins at a positive search effort with high output, low unemployment, and a high
job-finding rate. Then, in period 15, a sufficiently large shock to the discount factor pushes the
economy to the low search equilibrium until period 25, with a prolonged drop in output (as joint
ventures terminate faster than they are replaced), high unemployment, and a low job-finding
rate. In that period, a large positive discount factor shock shifts the economy back to the active
equilibrium with positive search effort.
Figure 11 plots the ergodic distribution of selected variables implied by the entire simulation.
Endogenous switches between the two equilibria generate a distinctive bimodal distribution of
aggregate variables. As required by our calibration, the figure implies that the economy spends
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Figure 11: Ergodic distribution with i.i.d. shocks to ξt
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about 85% of the time in the active equilibrium and 15% in the passive equilibrium. In the
active equilibrium, the unemployment rate fluctuates around 5.5%. In the passive equilibrium
with zero search effort, unemployment fluctuates around 8.7%. Similarly, the job-finding rate
moves around 45% in the active equilibrium and 27% in the passive equilibrium.
Figure 12: Distribution of unemployment rate and output in the data
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To compare our results to the data, Figure 12 plots the empirical distribution for the
unemployment rate and real GDP per capita (unemployment rate is monthly from 1960 to
2018; real GDP per capita is quarterly from 1960 to 2018 and is linearly detrended in logs).
The distribution of both variables shows skewness and bi-modality that is consistent with the
prediction of our model. The Hartigan’s dip test for unimodality (Hartigan et al., 1985) rejects
unimodality for the unemployment rate and real GDP per capita with 5% and 1% significance
levels, respectively. See Pizzinelli et al. (2018) and Taschereau-Dumouchel and Schaal (2015)
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for additional evidence on skewness and bi-modality in macroeconomic variables. Recall, when
comparing the simulated and real data, that our Figure 11 is generated –for parsimony– only
with shocks to the discount factor, while the data in Figure 12 are driven by a combination of
different shocks. Nonetheless, the behavior of the model is commendable.
Table 3: Second moments
u v v/u lp ξ
(a) Quarterly U.S. data, 1951-2016
Autocorrelation coefficient 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.90 −
Standard deviation 0.20 0.21 0.40 0.02 −
u 1 -0.92 -0.98 -0.25 −
Correlation matrix v 1 0.98 0.29 −
v/u 1 0.27 −
lp 1 −
(b) Benchmark model
Autocorrelation coefficient 0.82 0.55 0.71 0.88 0
Standard deviation 0.10 0.21 0.28 0.02 0.03
u 1 -0.71 -0.85 -0.94 -0.06
Correlation matrix v 1 0.97 0.54 0.39
v/u 1 0.72 0.30
lp 1 0.00
ξ 1
(c) Model without search complementarities
Autocorrelation coefficient 0.06 -0.27 -0.08 1 0
Standard deviation 0.02 0.04 0.05 0 0.03
u 1 -0.27 -0.56 0 -0.56
Correlation matrix v 1 0.95 0 0.95
v/u 1 0 1.00
lp 1 0
ξ 1
Panel (a) of Table 3 reports various second moments of observed business cycle statistics
following the same structure as in Shimer (2005, Table 1). Panel (b) reports second moments of
the benchmark model with two DSSs. Finally, panel (c) reports second moments of a version
of the model without search complementarities and calibrated on the active equilibrium. Each
entry presents the autocorrelation coefficient, the standard deviation, and the correlation matrix
for the variables listed across the first row of the table.
Several lessons arise from Table 3. First, our model generates a robust internal propagation:
the autocorrelation coefficients of the aggregate variables are significantly larger than in the
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model without complementarities and much closer to the observed ones. Complementarities in
search effort plus history dependence amplify and prolong the effect of shocks.
Second, our model generates large and empirically plausible standard deviations for the
selected variables that are substantially larger than those in the model without complementarities.
This property of the model comes from the amplification of shocks created by the shift between
equilibria.
Third, our model produces endogenous movements in labor productivity (“lp” in the table)
that would be otherwise absent. The model assumes that firms manufacture goods after matching
with a partner. Hence, measured labor productivity depends on the endogenous fraction of the
joint ventures over the total number of firms, ni,t/ (n˜i,t + ni,t). In comparison, without inter-firm
matches, labor productivity is exogenous. Table 3 shows that business cycle statistics for labor
productivity generated by our benchmark model are close to those in the data.
Fourth, the benchmark model generates a correlation between unemployment and vacancies
(i.e., the Beveridge curve) equal to -0.71, which is close to the value of -0.92 in the data and
much larger than the correlation of -0.27 in the model without complementarities. The large
negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment is a direct consequence of strategic
complementarities in search effort. In the active equilibrium with high search efforts, there
is robust vacancy posting and low unemployment, while the relationship is reversed in the
passive equilibrium. The switching between equilibria results in periods with a consistently
negative relationship between vacancies and unemployment that generates the downward sloping
Beveridge curve.
Finally, Figure 13 shows generalized impulse response functions (GIRF) of selected variables
to a 12% (solid line) and 10% (dashed line) shock to ξt, respectively (we are not dealing with a
linear model; thus, we use the adjective “generalized”). In period t = 1, the economy starts
from the active DSS. In period t = 2, an exogenous and one-period disturbance to the discount
factor hits the economy. When the contractionary shock to ξt is 10%, the firm’s search effort
temporarily declines in response to the fall in the stream of benefits in forming a joint venture,
generating a temporary fall in labor market tightness and a rise in the unemployment rate.
This shock is too small to move the system to the passive equilibria and the variables return
to the original DSS. However, when the fall in ξt is sufficiently large, search effort across firms
ends, and the system moves to the equilibrium with zero search effort, low output, and high
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unemployment. While the shock is only 2% larger (12% instead of 10%), its effects are quite
different: search complementarities induce large non-linearities in the model.
Figure 13: GIRFs to a negative discount factor shock
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Note: Each panel shows the response of a variable to a negative discount factor shock (ξt) with
magnitudes of 0.10 (solid line) and 0.12 (dashed line).
7 Evidence on the theoretical mechanism
The mechanism in our model builds on three legs: the existence of search complementarities
among firms that lead to a joint movement of output and intermediate inputs, the shocks to
the discount factor, and history dependence. We will not discuss the last leg. As argued in the
introduction, history dependence is an intuitive selection device that has shown considerable
empirical success in experiments (Van Huyck et al., 1990, 1991). We focus, instead, on the
existence of search complementarities and the shocks to the discount factor.
7.1 Search complementarities
Through the lenses of our model, search effort can be measured by the inputs employed by final
(customer) and intermediate (supplier) industries in forming value-added chains. Thus, we can go
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to the data and look at how these inputs co-move to check whether there are complementarities
in search effort among partners.
We identify each industry’s supplier industries from the BEA input-output tables, which
report the use of intermediate input for 66 private industries in 3-digit NAICS. Following
Michaillat and Saez (2015), we approximate customer industries’ search efforts as the number of
workers whose occupation is ordering, buying, purchasing, and procurement, which are available
from the OES database. This database, constructed by the BLS, reports yearly employment
and wage at the 3-digit-NAICS industry levels, with detailed occupation level between 2003 and
2018. Analogously, we approximate supplier industries’ search efforts as the number of workers
whose occupation is advertising, marketing, sales, demonstration, and promotion. We measure
search effort in terms of both employment level and, to check the effects of removing long-run
trends, employment growth.
Since our model is stylized in terms of firms’ heterogeneity (we only have two types of
firms), search effort in each sector moves together according to variations in the aggregate state
variables. Such co-movement does not allow the identification between search complementarities
and time effects. Instead, we take advantage of industry- and firm-specific shocks in the data to
exploit cross-sectional variation and estimate:
σi,t = ωσ
connect
i,t + υi + γt + i,t, (37)
where σi,t is the measure of search effort of industry i as a customer industry at period t, σ
connect
i,t
is the search effort of industry i’s supplier industries, and υi and γt are the industry and the time
fixed effects, respectively. Since each industry has multiple supplier industries, we measure the
average search effort for industry i’s supplier industries as the mean of these supplier industries’
search effort weighted by the value of intermediate goods that industry i purchases from them.
Hence, industries that supply more intermediate goods to industry i are assigned a higher weight.
The point estimates ω̂ = 0.44 and ω̂ = 0.18 (columns (1) and (2) in Table 4) show that the
search efforts of supplier industries are positively correlated with the search efforts of customer
industries, both in levels and in growth rates. The correlations are statistically significant, which
supports the existence of search complementarity.
While our point estimates verify the negative slope of the best response curve, it is not
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Table 4: Search efforts are positively correlated between connected industries
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measure of search efforts Search-related employment Signaling cost
Level Growth rate Level Growth rate
σconnecti,t 0.44*** 0.18* 1.04*** 0.29*
(0.08) (0.10) (0.16) (0.17)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.12 0.07 0.23 0.17
Observations 15× 47 14× 47 21× 66 20× 66
Note: Data are yearly from 2003 to 2016 and 1998 to 2017 for columns (1) (2) and (3) (4), respectively.
The dependent variables are the search effort of industry i. σconnecti,t is the search effort of industry i’s
supplier industries and connected industries, respectively. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered
at the industry level. * and *** denote significance at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.
straightforward to interpret the level of the point estimates. First, the likely presence of
measurement error in σconnecti,t biases ω̂ down. Second, and more importantly, equation (28)
defines a best response function for σi,t that is state-dependent, not just one value. For example,
the elasticity of effort by one firm with respect to the effort of other firms varies from 1.04 to
0.5 as we move from a level of effort of 50% of the search effort in the active DSS to 150%.
Unfortunately, estimating the whole best response function is most likely beyond the capability
of the available data.
As an alternative exercise, we approximate search effort by the signaling costs that make firms
more visible to potential trading partners. Following Hall (2014), we approximate an industry
i’s signaling cost as the value of its intermediate input from the four industries of publishing,
motion picture/sound recording, broadcasting/telecommunications, and data processing/internet
publishing/other information services, obtained from BEA input-output tables. A critical
difference between this measurement and our previous measurement is that the former gauges
the search effort outsourced from the other industries, while the latter focuses on the search
effort exerted within the industry.
More precisely, we measure search costs as the growth rate of the intermediate input from the
industries above by deriving a measure of the search effort for industry i’s connected industries
by weighting search effort measures by the value of input-output intermediate goods traded with
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industry i. Then, we estimate the same regression model as before:
σi,t = ωσ
connect
i,t + χi + γt + i,t,
where σi,t is the measure of search effort of industry i, σ
connect
i,t is the search effort of industry i’s
connected industries, which include both industry i’s customer and supplier industries, and υi
and γt are the industry and the year fixed effects, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) in Table
4 show that search efforts are positively correlated between connected industries, which again
support the existence of search complementarities.
Once we have ascertained the existence of search complementarities, we provide evidence
for the positive relationship between inter-firm matches and firm growth measures. We use
the list of major customers for U.S. publicly listed firms from Compustat Customer Segment
data (publicly listed firms in the U.S. are required to disclose the identity of major customers
that account for at least 10% of annual sales). We measure match creation by using a dummy
variable (pari,t) equal to one if firm i reports at least a new major customer in year t. Columns
(a) and (b) in Table 5 show a significant and positive relationship between match creation and
the firm’s market value and sales growth. When we control for year fixed effects (Columns (c)
and (d)), the effect of match creation on sales growth becomes insignificant, while its effect on
the growth rate of market value remains statistically significant and economically large.
Table 5: Match creation and firm growth
(a) (b) (b) (d)
Market Return Sales Growth Market Return Sales Growth
pari,t 0.144** 0.026** 0.119* 0.008
(0.065) (0.012) (0.067) (0.012)
Time FE No No Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08
Observation 2,456 2,219 2,456 2,219
Note: Data are yearly from 1999 to 2014. The dependent variables are the yearly growth rates of market
value and sales, obtained from CRSP and Compustat Fundamentals Annual data, respectively. pari,t is
a dummy variable equal to one if firm i reports at least one new major customer in year t according
to the major customer records constructed by Compustat Customer Segment data. We restrict the
analysis to firms with continuous records of major customers between 1999 and 2014. Standard errors
are in the parentheses. * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.
We complete our argument by showing that output and intermediate inputs co-move in
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the fashion predicted by search complementarities. The BEA compiles a measure of gross
output (O) equal to the sum of an industry’s value added (V A) and intermediate inputs (II),
i.e., O = V A + II. BEA data are annual over the period 1997-2015. Figure 14 plots the
cyclical component of gross output (blue line), intermediate inputs (red line), and industry
value added (yellow line) together with NBER-dated recession periods (grey bands). We extract
the cyclical component of the variable using an HP filter. The figure reveals that fluctuations
in intermediate inputs are more procyclical than those in output. The period of the Great
Recession is characterized by a sharp fall in intermediate input and gross production across
industries, while the value added remained more stable.
Figure 14: Intermediate inputs, value added, and gross output
To establish the relative contribution of value added and industry input to the overall
volatility of gross output, we decompose the variance of the gross industrial output in terms of
the covariance terms: Var(O) = Cov(V A,O) + Cov(II, O). Using this identity, together with
the definition O = V A + II, and plugging in observed data, we find that the contribution of
industry inputs to movements in industrial gross output is:
Cov(II, V A+ II)
Var(V A+ II)
= 0.71. (38)
Thus, fluctuations in intermediate input account for 71% of overall movements in gross industry
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output. This average contribution increases during recessions. For instance, in 2008, industry
intermediate input decreased by 1.9 trillion, making up 84% of the decline in gross industrial
output (2.3 trillion).
7.2 Discount factor shocks
The second leg in the model is the relevance of discount factor shocks for fluctuations in
intermediate inputs and aggregate fluctuations. The presence of discount factor shocks has been
documented in a long list of papers. See, among many others, Justiniano and Primiceri (2008),
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2015), Cochrane (2011), and Hall (2016, 2017). These authors
have argued that, beyond pure shocks to preferences, discount factor shocks can also represent
demographic shifts, movements in financial frictions, fluctuations in risk tolerance, and changes
in fiscal and monetary policy that we abstract from in the model.
Our task is to relate measures of the discount factor to changes in aggregate output,
unemployment, and inter-firm matching. To do so, we use the standard definition of the discount
factor as the ratio of the current market price of a future cash receipt to the expected value of
the payment (our households are risk neutral and, hence, we do not need to adjust for risk).
There are three popular measures of the discount factor. In measure 1, we follow Hall (2017)
and construct the series for the market discount rate for dividends payable from one year (12
months) to two years (24 months) as: ξt = pt/(Et
∑24
τ=13 dt+τ ), where pt is the market price in
month t of the claim of future dividends inferred from option prices and the stock price, and dt is
the dividend paid in month t. The data on pt are from Binsbergen et al. (2012). In measure 2, we
proxy the discount factor using the price-dividend ratio (p/d) of the stock market, as described
in Cochrane (2011). Finally, in measure 3, we proxy the discount rate rt using the measure
of expected returns from the S&P stock price index. We obtain the median 12-months-ahead
forecast of the stock market index (mnemonics: SPIF, Forecast12month) from the Livingston
Survey. Then, we divide by the index of the base period to calculate the expected gross return
1 + rt and compute the discount factor as ξt = 1/ (1 + rt).
Figure 15 plots the three alternative measures of the discount factor for the period between
January 1996 and May 2009. All three measures agree that i) there was a sizable decline in the
discount factor during the Great Recession (as our theory requires) and ii) the series display
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Table 6: Discount factor: standard deviation and correlation matrix
(a) (b) (c)
Livingston Survey S&P dividend strip p/d ratio
Standard Deviation 0.04 0.12 0.10
Correlation matrix
Livingston Survey 1 0.19 0.46
S&P dividend strip p/d ratio 1 0.34
P/d ratio 1
high variance (reflecting the large sensitivity of the discount factor over the business cycle, also
required by our theory). The low correlation across the three measures (see Table 6 and, for
similar results, Hall, 2017) is not surprising, since each of these series reflects discounting from
different financial players and assets.
Figure 15: Alternative measures of the discount factor
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Note: Alternative measures of the discount factor from dividend strip (red line), the price-to-dividend
ratio (green line), and the Livingston Survey (blue line) between January 1996 and May 2017.
Finally, Table 7 shows that the three measures of the discount factor are positively correlated
with GDP and input of intermediate goods (columns (a) and (c)), and negatively correlated with
unemployment (column (b)). The discount factor positively correlates with the rate of match
creation (column (d)), measured from Compustat Customer Segment data. These patterns
corroborate the important relation between shocks to the discount factor and movements in
production, unemployment, and inter-firm matching highlighted by our model.
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Table 7: Correlation between discount rates and aggregate variables
Correlation coefficient (a) (b) (c) (d)
Unemployment rate GDP Intermediate input Match creation
Livingston Survey -0.55 0.53 0.42 0.16
S&P dividend strip p/d ratio -0.33 0.50 0.21 0.32
P/d ratio -0.75 0.80 0.53 0.79
Note: Discount rates and unemployment: monthly data from January 1996 to May 2009. GDP:
quarterly data from 1996Q1 to 2009Q1. Intermediate input: annual data from 1997 to 2009. Rate of
match creation: annual data from 1996 to 2009. Series are HP filtered.
8 The volatility of shocks
We now guage how the volatility of the shocks to the economy determines the dynamic properties
of the model and the likelihood and duration of each equilibrium.
8.1 Analytical illustration with a simplified model
To gain intuition, and before we report the quantitative results from the full model, we derive
an analytical characterization of the effect of volatility on the likelihood and duration of each
static equilibrium by simplifying the model in Section 3. First, we assume firms produce their
output without labor. Thus, we can drop the whole DMP module of the model and set a
constant measure of size 1 of firms in each sector. Second, we assume that δ˜ = 1, i.e., all joint
ventures terminate after one period. Also, joint ventures start producing in the same period in
which firms match. Hence, the firm’s problem is equivalent to a sequence of static maximization
problems and we do not need to specify a discount factor. To ease the algebra, we also set
ρz = 0, and as in the calibration in Section 5, τ˜ = 0.5 and ν = 2. This simplified model is nearly
identical to the model in Section 2 except for a slightly different matching function.
Under these simplifications, each firm optimally chooses the level of its search effort, σi,t, given
the search effort of the firms in the opposite sector, σ−i,t, and productivity, zt, by maximizing:
Ji,t(σi,t, σ−i,t, zt) = (φ+ (ψ + σi,t) (ψ + σ−i,t))
zt
2
− c0σi,t − c1
σ3i,t
3
.
The first term of the RHS is the inter-firm matching probability defined in equation (12)
multiplied by half the expected production, pii,tzt (recall the equal split of output between the
firms given τ˜ = 0.5) minus the cost of searching.
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The interior solution σi,t > 0 satisfies:
c0 + c1σ
2
i,t = (ψ + σ−i,t)
zt
2
. (39)
Otherwise, σi,t = 0. Hence, as in the benchmark model, the simplified model entails passive and
active equilibria. The passive equilibrium with zero search effort exists if and only if
c0 > ψ
zt
2
. (40)
From equation (40), we can define a threshold of productivity z¯ = 2c0
ψ
that determines whether
the passive equilibrium exists.
Lemma 2. The passive equilibrium exists if and only if zt < z¯.
Recall that we assumed that ψ > 0. If ψ = 0, a passive equilibrium always exists regardless
of the value of zt.
In an active equilibrium, firms in each sector optimally choose a positive search effort that
comes from finding the fixed point of the product of equation (39) for each sector:
σF,t = σI,t =
zt +
√
z2t + 8ψzt − 16c0c1
4c1
. (41)
This optimal search effort is increasing in zt.
9
From equation (41), the threshold for the active equilibrium is z = 4
(√
ψ2c21 + c1c0 − ψc1
)
,
and we get the following lemma.10
Lemma 3. An active equilibrium exists if and only if zt ≥ z.
Proposition 10 merges lemmas 2 and 3 to characterize the range of values zt compatible with
multiple equilibria.
Proposition 10. The economy retains multiple equilibria if zt ∈ (z, z¯). The passive equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium if zt ≤ z. The active equilibrium is the unique equilibrium if zt ≥ z¯.
9There is a second fixed point, σi,t =
zt−
√
z2t+8ψzt−16c0c1
4c1
. However, this solution is locally unstable.
10To prevent the marginal search cost from converging to zero when σi,t is zero, the term c0 must be positive.
If c0 = 0, it yields z = 0. In such an instance, the active equilibrium exists for any positive value of zt.
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Proposition 10 establishes that if economic fundamentals are sufficiently weak or strong, the
static equilibrium is unique, either passive or active; otherwise, we have two static equilibria.
Sufficiently large shocks to zt move the system between the two alternative static equilibria.
Proposition 10 is empirically relevant because we can calibrate ψ to a small number so that z¯ is
low and c1 to a large number so that z is high. In that way, the model will allow multiple static
equilibria for a wide range of productivity z < 1 < z¯.
Since we have set ρz = 0, log (zt) ∼ N (0, σ2z). Using the distribution for zt and the thresholds
z and z, we derive the transition matrix between equilibria:
Active Passive
Active 1− Φ [log (z) /σz] Φ [log (z) /σz]
Passive 1− Φ [log (z¯) /σz] Φ [log (z¯) /σz]
where Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. The next proposition establishes that
aggregate volatility plays a critical role in the selection and duration of each static equilibrium.
Proposition 11. The expected duration of a passive equilibrium spell is 1
Φ[log(z)/σz ] , and the
expected duration of an active equilibrium spell is 1
1−Φ[log(z¯)/σz ] . The duration of each equilibrium
is inversely related to the volatility of zt.
Proposition 11 shows that a reduction in volatility induces the system to remain for a
prolonged spell in one static equilibrium, with a decreased probability for the system to move
to the alternative static equilibrium. However, if a sufficiently large change in fundamentals
triggers a change in the static equilibrium, the economy would move to the alternative static
equilibrium and stay there for a long time.
The dynamics in the simple model are consistent with the large and ongoing low employment-
to-population ratio in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-2009 (even if the headline
unemployment rate recovered by early 2017). The financial crisis was preceded by a long spell
of stable economic conditions during the Great Moderation that started in the mid-1980s, which
the model identifies as a prerequisite for the unprecedented persistence in the low employment-
to-population ratio.11
11See, nevertheless, for an alternative interpretation of the data based on a change in long-run growth trends,
Fernald et al. (2017).
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8.2 Simulation with the benchmark model
With the intuition from the simplified model, we return to our benchmark model to assess the
quantitative effect of changes in the volatility of shocks. Table 8 reports business cycle statistics
for a low (column (a)) and a high (column (b)) variance of shocks to the discount factor (σξ). As
before, we simulate the model for 3,000,000 months and time average to obtain quarterly data.
The first and second rows report the number of periods and the average duration of the passive
equilibrium, respectively, and the third row reports the transition matrix between equilibria. We
calibrate high and low volatility by following Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), who estimate that
the volatility of the discount factor shocks is equal to 0.07 before 1984 and 0.04 after that date.
Table 8: Variance of shocks and duration of equilibria
(a) (b)
σξ = 0.04 σξ = 0.07
Fraction of periods in passive equilibrium 0.11 0.27
Average number of quarters at a passive equilibrium 11 3.4
Transition matrix
Active Passive Active Passive
Active 0.98 0.02 0.89 0.11
Passive 0.09 0.91 0.29 0.71
The passive equilibrium materializes with a probability of around 11% in the low-volatility
economy, in contrast with 27% probability in the high-volatility economy. Despite the lower
chance of moving to a passive equilibrium, the low-volatility economy stays longer on average in
a passive equilibrium, 11 quarters, than the high-volatility economy, 3.4 quarters. Low volatility
induces less frequent but long-lasting periods of low output and high unemployment.
The last two rows in Table 8 report the transition matrix between equilibria. The entries
reveal that the low-volatility economy transitions between equilibria infrequently. The probability
of moving from active equilibrium to passive equilibrium is equal to 2%, and the probability
of a reverse move from passive equilibrium to active equilibrium is equal to 9%. The rotation
among equilibria gets much higher in the high-volatility economy, as the probability of moving
from an active to a passive equilibrium is 11%, and the probability of a reverse move is 29%.
Appendix G includes the histograms of endogenous variables of interest in the model with
high and low probability. The most important lesson from those figures is the long left tail of
output when the volatility of ξt is high.
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8.3 The Great Moderation and the persistence of business cycles
Our model predicts that a lower volatility of fundamentals is associated with more prolonged
equilibrium spells. This prediction is consistent with the empirical pattern in the U.S. data.
Figure 16: The Great Moderation and labor market downturns
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In Figure 16, the upper panel plots the U.S. employment rate (blue curve) and its trend
(orange curve) estimated from an HP filter with λ = 1600 from 1996 to 2017. The light-
orange bars indicate labor market downturns. Inspired by the NBER’s methodology in defining
recessions, we define a labor market downturn as starting when the employment rate falls below
the trend for two quarters and ending when the employment rate rises above the trend for two
quarters. As noted by many researchers (see Jaimovich and Siu 2012 and references therein), the
figure shows how the three labor market downturns that occurred after 1984 were longer than the
previous ones. Precisely after 1984, the U.S. economy experienced a substantial reduction in the
volatility of business cycle fluctuations, which Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) and Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde et al. (2015) attribute, in part, to a lower volatility of shocks to fundamentals. To
illustrate this point, the bottom panel in Figure 16 plots the cyclical component of real GDP
per capita, with a grey area to indicate the Great Moderation that started around 1984.
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Our model suggests an intrinsic linkage between the Great Moderation and the increasing
persistence in labor market downturns. While the Great Moderation improves macroeconomic
stability and reduces the occurrences of recessions, it makes these recessions and the associated
labor market downturns more durable.
9 The role of fiscal policy
In our model, government spending that stimulates joint venture formation may permanently
move the system from a passive to an active equilibrium, inducing a large fiscal multiplier. To
study this hypothesis, we embed government spending in the economy and derive the analytical
conditions for fiscal policy to move the system from a passive to an active equilibrium. We then
investigate the effect of public spending on the DSSs in the model. Finally, we evaluate the size
and state dependence of the impact of government spending.
9.1 Government spending as a set of final-goods producers
We focus our investigation on government spending defined as government consumption expen-
ditures and gross investment. We ignore transfers because our model abstracts from aggregate
demand considerations. We model government spending as an exogenous increase in the number
of single firms in the final-goods sector, where these additional firms can be interpreted as
new public projects such as building a new school. Thus, we have government-owned single
final-goods firms, n˜GF,t, that operate together with private single firms in both sectors. The
formation of private firms remains endogenous, as described by equation (14). We assume that
government spending is financed by lump-sum taxes.
The law of motion for government single final-goods firms, n˜GF , is:
n˜GF,t+1 = (1− δ − piF ) n˜GF,t + Gt , (42)
where Gt are the new government-owned single firms created in period t.
12 Like the private
firms in the final-goods sector, government-owned firms must form a joint venture with firms
12We assume that government spending shocks hit once per year. With probability 1/12, Gt is drawn from
uniform distribution with the support [0, n˜F,t/2]. Otherwise, 
G
t = 1. This specification ensures a non-negative
measure of government firms and that the inter-firm matching market tightness ratio does not explode.
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in the intermediate-goods sector to manufacture goods (for example, a public school requires
CFRPs produced by private firms). Joint ventures with government-owned firms, nGF , follow:
nGF,t+1 =
(
1− δ − δ˜
)
nGF,t + piF n˜
G
F,t. (43)
A government firm exits the market when its job match or joint venture is terminated.
The inflow Gt changes the matching probabilities in the inter-firm matching market:
piI,t = [φ+ (ψ + σI) (ψ + σF )]H
(
1, θ˜t
)
, (44)
and
piF = [φ+ (ψ + σI) (ψ + σF )]H
(
1
θ˜t
, 1
)
, (45)
where θ˜t = (n˜F,t + n˜
G
F,t)/n˜I,t is the inter-firm matching market tightness ratio in the presence of
government single firms.
Since H is increasing in both arguments, Gt > 0 increases the matching probability for
intermediate-goods firms (more potential partners) and decreases the matching probability for
final-goods firms (stiffer competition for partners). These changes in matching probabilities, in
turn, move search effort and, potentially, the equilibrium of the economy.
Total government spending is equal to the output produced by government-owned firms in
joint ventures and the single government-owned firms’ search cost:
gt = ztn
G
F + n˜
G
F
(
c0σF + c1
σ1+νF
1 + ν
)
.
Gross aggregate output comprises government and private production: yt = zt(n
G
F,t+nF,t), and it
is used for private consumption, government spending, and search costs. The aggregate resource
constraint is:
yt = ct + gt +
∑
i=I,F
χvi +
∑
i=I,F
n˜i
(
c0σi + c1
σ1+νi
1 + ν
)
. (46)
9.2 Shocks to government spending and equilibria switches
We assume that the economy is in the passive equilibrium (i.e., σI = σF = 0) before the arrival
of a positive government spending shock, Gt .
50
Upon the realization of the shock, the passive equilibrium continues to exist if and only if:
β˜ξtψH
(
1, θ˜t
)
Et
(
JI,t+1 − J˜I,t+1 | ι = 0
)
< c0, (47)
and
β˜ξtψH
(
θ˜−1t , 1
)
Et
(
JF,t+1 − J˜F,t+1 | ι = 0
)
< c0. (48)
where, recall, β˜ = β (1− δ) /τ . Equation (47) shows that the passive equilibrium disappears if
the increase of a government-owned single firm tightens the inter-firm matching market enough
and makes the expected capital gain of intermediate-goods firms so high that these firms search
with positive effort even if the final-goods firms search with zero effort.
Proposition 12. Starting from the passive equilibrium, the size of government spending needed
to move the system to the active equilibrium is:
n˜GF,t
n˜I,t
> Ψ
 c0
β˜ξψEt
(
JI,t+1 − J˜I,t+1 | ι = 0
)
− n˜F,t
n˜I,t
, (49)
with Ψ
′
> 0.13
Equation (49) shows that the magnitude of the policy intervention that moves the economy
to an active equilibrium is proportional to the cost-to-benefit ratio of forming a joint venture;
and it decreases with the measure of the private firms in the final-goods sector relative to
intermediate-goods firms. A large quantity of private final-goods firms improves the joint venture
prospects for intermediate-goods firms, decreasing the magnitude of government spending needed
to move to the active equilibrium.
9.3 Quantitative results
We providing now quantitative results regarding the dynamic response of the economy to
expansionary fiscal policy shocks and the size of the fiscal multiplier. See Appendix D.2 for
details of the computation of the model in this case. Once we introduce government spending,
13Denote h
(
θ˜
)
= H
(
1, θ˜
)
. Ψ is the inverse function of h (·). As h (·) is strictly increasing in θ˜ by assumption,
Ψ is also a strictly increasing function. In our calibration: h (θ) = 2
1
κ
(
1 + θ˜−κt
)− 1κ
, Ψ (x) = (2x−κ − 1)− 1κ .
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we have 12 state variables. Due to this large number of state variables, we implement a
dimensionality reduction algorithm inspired by Krusell and Smith (1998) that is of interest in
itself and potentially applicable to similar problems.
Figure 17: GIRFs to positive government spending shock
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Note: Each panel shows the response of a variable to a one-period, 15% (dashed line) and 20% (solid
line) increase in government spending.
Figure 17 shows the dynamic reaction of selected variables to the same 15% (dotted line) and
20% (solid line) shocks to the relative size of the final-goods sector that we just described when the
economy starts at the passive equilibrium DSS (Appendix H shows the responses for the system
that starts from the active equilibrium). Since the 20% fiscal expansion satisfies Proposition
12, it produces a significant and persistent increase in output and a fall in unemployment.
Nevertheless, this fiscal expansion crowds out private consumption upon impact. This reaction
is due to two mechanisms. First, a rise in government-owned firms reduces, in the short run, the
formation of joint ventures that produce goods for private consumption. Second, the shift of
equilibrium triggers an increase in the cost associated with vacancy posting and joint venture
formation, which further reduces private consumption. The first mechanism still exists in the
15% fiscal expansion, inducing a small drop in private consumption even when the system stays
in the passive equilibrium.
We also calculate the fiscal multiplier for our economy, defined as the ratio of the cumulative
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change in output over one quarter and one year, generated by the one-period change in government
spending triggered by the inflow of government-owned single firms in the final-goods sector (we
could compute the fiscal multiplier at other horizons if desired). Panel (a) in Figure 18 shows the
fiscal multiplier as a function of the inflow of government-owned single firms when the economy
is in the passive equilibrium at the start of the fiscal expansion. Panel (b) replicates the exercise
for the case when the economy is in the active equilibrium.
Figure 18: Fiscal multiplier
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In the passive equilibrium, a sufficiently large fiscal expansion generates a multiplier larger
than 1 since it triggers a rise in search effort. The fiscal multiplier peaks at the threshold
where we shift from the passive to the active equilibrium. In our calibration, the peak quarterly
fiscal multiplier, 3.5, is at a 19% increase in the number of government-owned firms, which is
equivalent to a 3.8% increase in government spending relative to output in the first quarter
(since the increase in government spending is persistent, the overall size of the fiscal intervention
is larger than the impact change of 3.8%). Any stimulus beyond this level reduces the fiscal
multiplier because the crowding out of private consumption outweighs the increase in output
from the fiscal expansion. A doubling in the number of government-owned final-goods firms
generates a fiscal multiplier of around 1 over a quarter. Similarly, a fiscal expansion below the
threshold generates a less than unitary fiscal multiplier since it creates a large crowding out
effect and no equilibrium switch.
Panel (b) in Figure 18 shows that the fiscal multiplier is substantially lower in the active
equilibrium. The increased costs of forming joint ventures for private firms in the final-goods
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sector reduce private output, and we have a less than unitary fiscal multiplier for any size of the
fiscal stimulus. The multiplier declines with the size of government spending for a crowding out
effect across a wide range of time horizons.
Our results in Figure 18 agree with the recent empirical literature that has documented the
acute state dependence of fiscal multipliers. See, for example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), Owyang et al. (2013), and Ghassibe and Zanetti (2019). Our model accounts for such
state dependence of fiscal multipliers parsimoniously.
10 Conclusion
This paper shows that search complementarities in the formation of inter-firm joint ventures
have broad implications for the magnitude and persistence of business cycle fluctuations and
the effect of fiscal policy. The optimal degree of search effort is either zero or positive, and the
system entails two static equilibria: an active one with large economic activity and a passive
one with high economic activity. Sufficiently large changes in fundamentals that change search
effort move the system between the two static equilibria.
The dynamic properties of our economy are unlike those of standard models. It generates
bimodal ergodic distributions of variables and protracted slumps. Macroeconomic volatility plays
an essential role in the selection and duration of each static equilibrium. In particular, large
negative shocks during spells of low volatility generate a persistent shift to the passive equilibrium,
which is consistent with the large and persistent deviation of economic variables from trend
after the financial crisis that started in 2007 in the aftermath of the Great Moderation. Fiscal
policy operates markedly different than in standard models, and it is powerful in stimulating
the economy in the passive equilibrium, with a non-monotonic effect on economic activity, while
its effectiveness significantly declines in the active equilibrium.
The analysis opens exciting avenues for additional research. A direct extension would be to
embed strategic complementarities in richer models of the business cycle such as those including
money, nominal rigidities, and financial frictions. Furthermore, the role of agent and spatial
heterogeneity deserves further exploration. We will pursue some of those ideas in future work.
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Appendix
We include, for completeness, a series of appendices. First, in Appendix A, we show the
derivation of the total surplus of a filled job and the capital gain from forming a joint venture.
Second, in Appendix B, we describe how we compute the DSSs of the model. Third, in Appendix
C, we present the proofs of several propositions in the main text. Fourth, in Appendix D, we
outline how to compute the model. Fifth, in Appendix E, we discuss the role of mixed-strategy
Nash equilibria in our model. Sixth, in Appendix F, we complete our discussion of the effects of
technology shocks. Seventh, in Appendix G, we look at the ergodic distribution of variables of
interest in cases of high and low volatility of the shocks to ξt. Last, in Appendix H, we report
the GIRFs to government spending shocks in the active equilibrium.
A Total surplus
The total surplus of a labor market match at time t in a joint venture in either sector i ∈ {I, F}
of the economy is TSi,t = Wi,t − Ui,t + Ji,t. Analogously, the total surplus of a filled job in a
single firm is T˜ Si,t = W˜i,t − Ui,t + J˜i,t.
Nash bargaining for wages implies that:
Ji,t = τTSi,t, (50)
Wi,t − Ui,t = (1− τ)TSi,t, (51)
J˜i,t = τ T˜Si,t, (52)
W˜i,t − Ui,t = (1− τ) T˜ Si,t, (53)
where τ is the firm’s bargaining weight, common across sectors. The free-entry condition of the
labor market is:
χ = βξtτH
(
θ˜t, 1
)
Et
(
T˜ SI,t+1
)
= βξtτH
(
1, 1/θ˜t
)
Et
(
T˜ SF,t+1
)
. (54)
The total surplus of establishing a joint venture is the sum of the capital gain from matching
for the firms in the intermediate-goods sector, JI,t − J˜I,t, and final-goods sector, JF,t − J˜F,t:
TSJVt = JI,t − J˜I,t + JF,t − J˜F,t.
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The price for intermediate goods, pt, is set according to the Nash bargaining rule:
JI,t − J˜I,t = τ˜TSJVt
JF,t − J˜F,t = (1− τ˜)TSJVt,
where τ˜ is the intermediate-goods producer’s bargaining power.
We derive now value functions for TSi,t, T˜ Si,t, and TSJVt. We start with the total surplus of
a filled job in a joint venture, TSi,t. Using the equations for WI,t, JI,t, and UI,t in the definition
of TSI,t, we get:
WI,t + JI,t − UI,t = ztpt − h
+ βξtEt
 (1− δ − δ˜) (WI,t+1 + JI,t+1 − UI,t+1)
+δ˜
(
W˜I,t+1 + J˜I,t+1 − UI,t+1
)
− µI,t
(
W˜I,t+1 − UI,t+1
)
 , (55)
or, equivalently,
TSI,t = ztpt − h+ βξtEt
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
TSI,t +
(
δ˜ − µI,t (1− τ)
)
T˜ SI,t
]
, (56)
where, in the interest of space, we omit the variable ιt.
Analogously, the total surplus of a filled job in a joint venture for the firm in the final-goods
sector F is:
TSF,t = zt (1− pt)− h+ βξtEt
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
TSF,t +
(
δ˜ − µF,t (1− τ)
)
T˜ SF,t
]
. (57)
Next, we derive the total surplus of a filled job in a single firm, T˜ Si,t. The equations for
W˜I,t, J˜I,t, and UI,t yield:
J˜I,t + W˜I,t − UI,t = −h− c
(
σ∗I,t
)
+
βξtEt
 (1− δ) (1− pi∗I,t) (J˜I,t+1 + W˜I,t+1 − UI,t+1)+
(1− δ) pi∗I,t (WI,t+1 + JI,t+1 − UI,t+1)− µI,t
(
W˜I,t+1 − UI,t+1
)
 , (58)
where σ∗I,t is the search effort that maximizes J˜I,t and pi
∗
I,t is the matching probability induced
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by σ∗I,t. By using the definition of T˜ Si,t above, we re-arrange the previous equation as:
T˜ SI,t = −h− c
(
σ∗I,t
)
+ βξtEt
[
(1− δ) piI,tTSI,t+1 + ((1− δ) (1− piI,t)− (1− τ)µI,t) T˜ SI,t+1
]
. (59)
Nash bargaining for wages, as shown by equation (52), indicates that firm and worker choose
search effort to maximize their joint surplus T˜ SI,t. Specifically, since σ
∗
I,t maximizes J˜I,t, it also
maximizes T˜ SI,t. Thus, equation (59) becomes:
T˜ SI,t = max
σI,t≥0
{
− h− c (σI,t)
+ βξtEt
[
(1− δ) piI,tTSI,t+1 + ((1− δ) (1− piI,t)− (1− τ)µI,t) T˜ SI,t+1
]}
, (60)
and where piI,t is an increasing function of σI,t.
We denote the gain for total surplus from forming a joint venture as ∆TSi,t = TSi,t − T˜ Si,t,
and rewrite equation (60) as:
T˜ SI,t = max
σI,t≥0
{
− h− c (σI,t)
+ βξtEt
[
(1− δ) piI,t∆TSI,t+1 + ((1− δ)− (1− τ)µI,t) T˜ SI,t+1
]}
. (61)
Similarly, we write the total surplus for single firms in the final-goods sector as:
T˜ SF,t = max
σF,t≥0
{
− h− c (σF,t)
+ βξtEt
[
(1− δ) piF,tTSF,t+1 + ((1− δ) (1− piF,t)− (1− τ)µF,t) T˜ SF,t+1
]}
, (62)
or, equivalently,
T˜ SF,t = max
σF,t≥0
{
− h− c (σF,t)
+ βξtEt
[
(1− δ) piF,t∆TSF,t+1 + ((1− δ)− (1− τ)µF,t) T˜ SF,t+1
]}
. (63)
Finally, we derive the total surplus of a joint venture, TSJVi,t. The Nash bargaining for the
intermediate goods price and wage yields ∆TSI,t =
τ˜
τ
TSJVt and ∆TSF,t =
(
1−τ˜
τ
)
TSJVt. Using
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equations (56) and (60) in the definition of ∆TSi,t produces:
∆TSI,t = min
σI,t
{
ztpt + c (σI,t) + β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ)piI,t
]
ξtEt (∆TSI,t+1)
}
, (64)
or after using the Nash bargaining condition ∆TSI,t =
τ
τ˜
TSJVt:
TSJVt = min
σI,t
{τ
τ˜
[ztpt + c (σI,t)] + β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ)piI,t
]
ξtEt (TSJVt+1)
}
. (65)
Analogously, the total surplus of a joint venture from sector F ’s optimization problem is:
TSJVt = min
σF,t
{ τ
1− τ˜ [zt (1− pt) + c (σF,t)]
+ β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) piF,t
]
ξtEt (TSJVt+1)
}
. (66)
Combining Equation (65)×τ˜+Equation (66)× (1− τ˜), pt cancels out and we find:
TSJVt = τ · zt + β
(
1− δ − δ˜
)
ξtEt (TSJVt+1)
+ min
σI,t
{
τ · c (σI,t)− β (1− δ) piI,tξtEt (τ˜ · TSJVt+1)
}
+ min
σF,t
{
τ · c (σF,t)− β (1− δ) piF,tξtEt [(1− τ˜) · TSJVt+1]
}
. (67)
The first-order conditions for {σI,t, σF,t} in equation (67) are:
β (1− δ) (ψ + σF,t)H
(
θ˜t, 1
)
τ˜ ξtEt (TSJVt+1) = τ [c0 + c1 (σI,t)ν ] , (68)
β (1− δ) (ψ + σI,t)H
(
1, θ˜−1t
)
(1− τ˜) ξtEt (TSJVt+1) = τ [c0 + c1 (σF,t)ν ] . (69)
The active equilibrium exists if and only if there exists a pair (σI,t, σF,t) > 0 that jointly
solves equations (68) and (69). In the symmetric equilibrium for which τ˜ = 1/2 and θ˜t = 1,
equations (68) and (69) become:
β˜ (ψ + σF,t) ξtEt
(
JI,t+1 − J˜I,t+1
)
= c0 + c1 (σI,t)
ν , (70)
β˜ (ψ + σI,t) ξtEt
(
JF,t+1 − J˜F,t+1
)
= c0 + c1 (σF,t)
ν , (71)
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where β˜ = β (1− δ) /τ . Equivalently, we can express the first-order conditions as:
β (1− δ) (ψ + σF,t) ξtEt (∆TSI,t+1) = c0 + c1 (σI,t)ν (72)
β (1− δ) (ψ + σI,t) ξtEt (∆TSF,t+1) = c0 + c1 (σF,t)ν . (73)
B Solving for the DSSs
To solve for the DSSs of our model, we evaluate the set of equilibrium conditions when the
variables remain constant over time and the exogenous state variables take their average value.
The model entails a passive and an active (stable) DSS. We disregard the active and unstable
DSS in our analysis. We denote the variables referring to the passive and active DSS with
superscript “pas” and “act,” respectively.
Using equation (67), the total surplus of a joint venture in the passive DSS is:
TSJV pas = τ · zss + 2τ · c (0)
+ βξss
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− τ˜ (1− δ) pipasI − (1− τ˜) (1− δ) pipasF
]
TSJV pas (74)
where c (0) = 0, pipasI = (φ+ ψ
2)H
(
1, θ˜pas
)
, and,
pipasF =
(
φ+ ψ2
)
H
(
1, 1/θ˜pas
)
. (75)
As in our baseline calibration, we set τ˜ = 0.5 and assume a symmetric equilibrium so that
θ˜pas = 1. Applying these conditions in equation (74) yields:
TSJV pas =
τ · zss
1− βξss
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) (φ+ ψ2)
] . (76)
The gain of total surplus from forming a joint venture in the passive DSS is determined
by ∆TSpasI =
τ˜
τ
TSJV pas and ∆TSpasF =
(
1−τ˜
τ
)
TSJV pas, which are useful in deriving the total
surplus of a filled job in the passive DSS.
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Analogously, the total surplus of a joint venture in the active DSS is:
TSJV act =
τ ·
[
zss +
(
c0σ
act
I + c1
(σactI )
ν+1
1+ν
)
+
(
c0σ
act
F + c1
(σactF )
ν+1
1+ν
)]
1− βξss
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− τ˜ (1− δ) piactI − (1− τ˜) (1− δ)piactF
] , (77)
where:
piactI =
[
φ+
(
σactF + ψ
) (
σactI + ψ
)]
H
(
1, θ˜act
)
,
and
piactF =
[
φ+
(
σactF + ψ
) (
σactI + ψ
)]
H
(
1, 1/θ˜act
)
.
By imposing the symmetry conditions τ˜ = 1/2, θ˜act = 1 and σactF = σ
act
I = σ
act, equation (77)
becomes:
TSJV act =
τ ·
[
zss + 2
(
c0σ
act + c1
(σact)
ν+1
1+ν
)]
1− βξss
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) [φ+ (σact + ψ)2]] . (78)
In the active DSS, the first-order condition for {σI,t, σF,t} described by equations (68) and
(69) is:
β (1− δ) (ψ + σact) ξssTSJV act
2
= τ
[
c0 + c1
(
σact
)ν]
. (79)
Equations (78) and (79) can be used to solve numerically for σact and TSJV act.
The gain of total surplus from forming a joint venture in the active DSS is determined by
∆TSactI =
τ˜
τ
TSJV act and ∆TSactF =
(
1−τ˜
τ
)
TSJV act. Next, we derive the total surplus of a filled
job in a single firm and the job-finding rate in the DSS. Using equation (59), the total surplus
of a filled job for a single firm in sector I in the passive DSS is:
T˜ S
pas
I = −h+ β
{
(1− δ)pipasI ·∆TSpasI + [(1− δ)− µpasI (1− τ)] T˜ S
pas
I
}
, (80)
where ∆TSpasI and pi
pas
I were solved analytically as in equations (75) and (76). Using the
matching function and free-entry condition in the labor market, the job-finding rate in the
passive DSS is:
µpasI =
(
βτT˜S
pas
I
χ
) α
1−α
. (81)
Equations (80) and (81) are solved numerically for T˜ S
pas
I and µ
pas
I .
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Applying the same approach, we solve for T˜ S
pas
F and µ
pas
F . Analogously, the total surplus of
a filled job in a single firm and the job-finding rate in the active DSS solves:
T˜ S
act
i = −h+
[
c0σ
act
i + c1
(σacti )
ν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β
{
(1− δ) piacti ·∆TSacti +
[
(1− δ)− µacti (1− τ)
]
T˜ S
act
i
}
, i ∈ F, I (82)
and
µacti =
(
βτT˜S
act
i
χ
) α
1−α
, i ∈ F, I. (83)
The total surplus of a filled job in a joint venture in the DSS is TSli = T˜ S
l
i + ∆TS
l
i, i ∈
{I, F} , l ∈ {act, pas}. The firm’s asset value in the DSS is J li = τTSli, J˜ li = τ T˜S
l
i, i ∈
{I, F} , l ∈ {act, pas}.
Finally, we can derive the DSS value for the remaining variables. Substituting the job-finding
rate into the matching function of the labor market, we get θpas = (µpas)
1
α and θact = (µact)
1
α .
The value for the unemployment rate, the measure of single firms, and the measure of joint
ventures in the passive and active DSS are:
upas =
δ
δ + µpas
uact =
δ
δ + µact
n˜pas =
δ˜ +
(
µpas − δ˜
)
upas
δ + pipas + δ˜
n˜act =
δ˜ +
(
µact − δ˜
)
uact
δ + piact + δ˜
npas = 1− upas − n˜pas
nact = 1− uact − n˜act.
The value for total final output in the passive and active DSSs is ypas = zssnpas and yact = zssnact,
respectively.
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C Proof of propositions
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We consider the case of symmetric sectors, so we drop the sector subscripts. We first
show that the labor market tightness ratio is strictly lower in the passive DSS, i.e., θpas < θact,
or, equivalently T˜ S
pas
< T˜S
act
, as implied by the free-entry condition of the labor market.
We start with
T˜ S
act
= −h+
[
c0σ
act + c1
(σact)
ν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β
{
(1− δ)piact ·∆TSact + [(1− δ)− µact (1− τ)] T˜ Sact} , (84)
and
µact =
(
βτT˜S
act
χ
) α
1−α
. (85)
which are equivalent to equations (82) and (83) except that here we drop the sector subscripts.
The values for T˜ S
act
and θact solve to equations (84) and (85). We rewrite equation (85), for
both DSSs, as
χ = βτqactT˜ S
act
= βτqpasT˜ S
pas
. (86)
Given the Cobb-Douglas matching function for the labor market, equation (86) is equivalent to:
θact =
(
βτT˜S
act
χ
) 1
1−α
. (87)
Applying equation (86) to equation (84), delivers:
(
1− τ
τ
)
χθact =
{
− h−
[
c0σ
act + c1
(σact)
ν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β (1− δ) piact ·∆TSact − [1− β (1− δ)] T˜ Sact
}
, (88)
where we used µact = θactqact. In equation (88), labor market tightness, θ, is linear and strictly
decreasing in the total surplus for a single firm, T˜ S. In equation (86), θ is strictly increasing in
T˜ S. Since σact and ∆TSact were solved in equations (78) and (79), they are treated as constant
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terms here. Hence, values for θact and T˜ S
act
solve:
(
1− τ
τ
)
χθ =
{
− h−
[
c0σ
act + c1
(σact)
ν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β (1− δ) piact ·∆TSact − [1− β (1− δ)] T˜ S
}
(89)
θ =
(
βτT˜S
χ
) 1
1−α
. (90)
Similarly, values for T˜ S
pas
and θpas solve:(
1− τ
τ
)
χθ = [−h+ β (1− δ) pipas ·∆TSpas]− [1− β (1− δ)] T˜ S, (91)
θ =
(
βτT˜S
χ
) 1
1−α
. (92)
In equations (89) and (91), θ is linear and strictly decreasing in T˜ S. In equations (90) and (92),
θ is strictly increasing in T˜ S.
For θact > θpas, it must be that the intercept term in equation (88) is greater than the
intercept term in equation (91), which occurs if:
− h−
[
c0σ
act + c1
(σact)
ν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β (1− δ) piact ·∆TSact > −h+ β (1− δ) pipas ·∆TSpas. (93)
To simplify notation, denote W (σ) = −h+ W1(σ)
W2(σ)
, where
W1 (σ) =
[
β
(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− 1
] [
c0σ + c1
σν+1
1 + ν
]
+ β (1− δ) [φ+ (ψ + σ)2] ,
W2 (σ) = 1− β
{(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) [φ+ (ψ + σ)2]} .
It can be shown that equation (93) is equivalent to W (σact) > W (0). We verify that, for
σ ∈ (0,√1− φ− ψ), dW1
dσ
/W1 >
dW2
dσ
/W2, which implies dW/dσ > 0. Consequently, equation
(93) holds, and θact > θpas.
Since the job-finding rate is strictly increasing in labor market tightness, µact > µpas. Since
u = δ/ (δ + µ) in the DSS, uact < upas holds.
Finally, we show that yact > ypas. Since y = n and n = 1− n˜− u, yact > ypas is equivalent to
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show that n˜act + uact < n˜pas + upas.
In the DSS, it holds that:
n˜+ u =
δ˜ + (pi + µ+ δ) δ
δ+µ
δ + pi + δ˜
. (94)
The RHS of equation (94) is strictly decreasing in both µ and pi. Given that µpas < µact and
pipas < piact, it holds that n˜act + uact < n˜pas + upas, or, equivalentlyyact > ypas.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Proposition 3 holds if it is optimal for firms in one sector to search with zero effort when
firms in the opposite sector search with zero effort. In such a case, the Nash equilibrium with
zero search effort exists in the passive DSS.
The firm’s maximization problem in the passive DSS is:
T˜ S
pas
= max
σ≥0
−h−
(
c0σ + c1
σν+1
1 + ν
)
+ β
(1− δ) [φ+ ψ (ψ + σ)] ·∆TSpas+ [(1− δ)− µpas (1− τ)] T˜ Spas
 . (95)
The total surplus of a single firm T˜ S
pas
is strictly concave in σ, for σ > 0. Hence, the corner
solution σ = 0 is optimal if and only if the first-order derivative is non-positive at σ = 0:
c0 + c10
ν ≥ β (1− δ)ψ∆TSpas, (96)
where ∆TSpas is given by equation (76), or, equivalently:
c0 >
β (1− δ)ψ
2− 2β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) (φ+ ψ2)
] , (97)
where we assume zss = 1, ξss = 1, and τ˜ = 0.5.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Proposition 4 holds if there exist σ ∈ (0,√1− φ− ψ) (to guarantee that the matching
probability is bounded by one) and ∆TS ∈ R that solve equations (79) and (78).
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By substituting equation (79) into equation (78), we get:
1 +
(
c0σ + c1
σν+1
1+ν
)
2− 2β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) [φ+ (σ + ψ)2]] = c0 + c1σ
ν
β (1− δ) (ψ + σ) , (98)
where we assume τ˜ = 1/2, ξss = 1, zss = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We first show that the Nash equilibrium in the passive DSS is stable. To do so, we
demonstrate that there exists an  > 0, such that when a firm in sector j deviates from the
passive DSS by searching with a small and positive effort bounded by , it remains optimal for
the firm in the opposite sector i to search with zero effort:
c0 + c10
ν > β (1− δ) (ψ + σj)E (∆TSi) , (99)
where σj ∈ (0, ). The RHS of equation (99) is a function of σj, which is continuous at σj = 0
(note that E (∆TSi) is a continuous function of σj). Given the existence of the passive DSS,
we know that c0 + c10
ν > β (1− δ)ψ∆TSpas. Because of continuity, there exists  > 0, so that
equation (99) holds when σj < .
Next, we show that one Nash equilibrium in the active DSS is stable when two active DSSs
exist. The best response function of sector i implied by equations (72) and (73) in the active
DSS is:
σi =

[
β(1−δ)(ψ+σj)∆TSact−c0
c1
] 1
ν
if β (1− δ) (ψ + σj) ∆TSact ≥ c0
0 if β (1− δ) (ψ + σj) ∆TSact < c0,
(100)
which is strictly increasing and concave in σj since c1 > 0 and ν > 1. When two active DSSs
exist, the best response curve (100) intersects with the 45-degree line at σF = σI = σ
∗ and
σF = σI = σ
∗∗ with 0 < σ∗ < σ∗∗ <
√
1− φ−ψ. Due to strict concavity, we have dσi
dσj
|σi=σj=σ∗> 1
and dσi
dσj
|σi=σj=σ∗∗< 1. Therefore, the active Nash equilibrium at σF = σI = σ∗ is unstable, while
the one at σF = σI = σ
∗∗ is stable.
Finally, consider the case when the passive DSS and one active DSS exist, where σF = σI = σ
∗
and 0 < σ∗ <
√
1− φ− ψ. Since the passive DSS exists, the inequality c0 > β (1− δ)ψ∆TSpas
holds. In addition, we have that ∆TSact < ∆TSpas, which results from equations (76) and
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(77). We also have that c0 > β (1− δ)ψ∆TSact. So σi (σj) = 0 in the active DSS for σj ∈ [0, σˆ]
with σˆ = c0
β(1−δ)∆TSact − ψ. Since σF = σI = σ∗ is the only intersection between σi (σj) and the
45-degree line in the range σj ∈ [σˆ, σ∗] with σi (σˆ) = 0, we must have dσidσj |σi=σj=σ∗≥ 1. When
the derivative is equal to one, the best response curves are tangent to the 45-degree line; when
the derivative is greater than one, the best response curve may have two intersections with the
45-degree line, in which case we have 0 < σ∗ <
√
1− φ− ψ < σ∗∗ which ensures that only one
intersection (σ∗) is the active equilibrium. Since the derivative is greater or equal to one, the
active static Nash equilibrium at σF = σI = σ
∗ is unstable.
D Model solution
In this appendix, we outline the algorithm to solve the model numerically.
D.1 Solution without government spending
We first discuss the solution to the benchmark case without government spending. The vector
of state variables is: St = (zt, ξt, ιt−1, ut, nt, n˜t), where we omit the sector subscripts. At the
beginning of period t, St is taken as given. The states zt and ξt are exogenous, and the states
ιt−1, ut, nt, and n˜t are endogenous and predetermined. To derive the solution of the system, we
require the value functions TSJV (St), and T˜ S (St); two policy functions σ (St), and θ (St); and
the transition rule of ιt = ι (ιt−1, St). The transition rule for the other endogenous states (ut, nt
and n˜t) is directly given by the model once the other functions have been found.
Because of sectoral symmetry, θ˜t = n˜F,t/n˜I,t = 1. As we will show below, a fixed θ˜ implies
that the value functions, policy functions, and the transition rule for ιt depend on (zt, ξt, ιt−1)
only.
Step 1: Solve for TSJV , σ and ι. Equation (67) can be rewritten as:
TSJV (zt, ξt, ιt−1) = min
σt≥0
τ · [zt + 2c (σt)] + β
{(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) [φ+ (ψ + σt) (ψ + σt)]
}
∗ ξtEt [TSJV (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt)] , (101)
where σt is the search effort in the opposite sector, taken as given by the firms. In the symmetric
equilibrium, σt = σt.
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The equilibrium type ιt is determined by the best response functions implied by equation
(101) and the history dependence of equilibrium selection. Specifically, if ιt−1 = 0 (passive
equilibrium in period t− 1), we first verify whether the passive equilibrium continues to exist in
period t by checking whether:
arg min
σt≥0
2c (σt)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σt)ψ] ξtEt [TSJV (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt = 0)] = 0 (102)
holds. If it does, the passive equilibrium exists and persists (i.e., ιt = ιt−1 = 0). Otherwise, the
passive equilibrium fails to exist and the active equilibrium is selected (i.e., ιt = 1).
Analogously, if ιt−1 = 1 (active equilibrium in period t− 1), we verify whether the active
equilibrium continues to exist in period t by checking whether:
arg min
σt≥0
2c (σt)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σt) (ψ + σ∗)] ξtEt [TSJV (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt = 1)] > 0 (103)
holds. If it does, the active equilibrium exists and persists (i.e., ιt = ιt−1 = 1). Otherwise, the
active equilibrium fails to exist and the passive equilibrium is selected (i.e., ιt = 0).
We use value function iteration methods to solve for the value function TSJV , the policy
function σ and the transition rule of ι using equation (101) and conditions (102) and (103).
Step 2: Solve for T˜ S and θ. Equation (59) can be rewritten as:
T˜ S (zt, ξt, ιt−1) = −h−c (σt)+βξtEt
 (1− δ) pit∆TS (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt) +
((1− δ)− (1− τ) θα (zt, ξt, ιt−1)) T˜ S (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt)
 , (104)
where we used ∆TSt+1 = TSt+1 − T˜ St+1 and µt = θαt .
The free-entry condition of the labor market (equation 54) can be rewritten as:
χ = βξtτθ
α−1 (zt, ξt, ιt−1)Et
[
T˜ S (zt+1, ξt+1, ιt)
]
. (105)
With ∆TSt = τ˜TSJVt/τ , σt, and ιt being solved in step 1, we find the value function T˜ S
and the policy function θ with equations (104) and (105) by using value function iteration.
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D.2 Solution with government spending
We consider now the case with government spending. This case is challenging to solve since,
in general, it implies sectoral asymmetry. The model’s vector of state variables is: St =(
zt, ξt, 
G
t , ιt−1, u
F
t , u
I
t , n
F
t , n
I
t , n
G
t , n˜
F
t , n˜
I
t , n˜
G
t
)
. States zt, ξt, and 
G
t are exogenous, and states
ιt−1, uFt , u
I
t , n
F
t , n
I
t , n
G
t , n˜
F
t , n˜
I
t , and n˜
G
t are endogenous. To derive the solution of the system, we
need the solution for the value functions TSJV (St), T˜ SF (St), and T˜ SI (St) (the other value
functions can be derived from these three value functions), the four policy functions σI (St),
σF (St), θI (St) and θF (St), and the transition rule of ιt = ι (ιt−1, St). The transition rule of the
other endogenous states is directly given by the model once the other functions have been found.
In the asymmetric case, the value functions, the policy functions, and the transition rule of
ιt depend on the entire vector of states St rather than a subset of St as in Appendix D.1. The
reason is that the measure of single firms
(
n˜Ft , n˜
I
t , n˜
G
t
)
determines the inter-firm market tightness
ratio θ˜t, which affects firms’ value and policy. In addition, the transition rule of
(
n˜Ft , n˜
I
t , n˜
G
t
)
depends on the
(
uFt , u
I
t , n
F
t , n
I
t , n
G
t
)
.
Given the high dimension of the state space, we simplify the model solution with a fore-
cast rule for θ˜ that only depends on a small number of state variables. This approach is
inspired by similar ideas in Krusell and Smith (1998). Intuitively, firms do not need to know(
uFt , u
I
t , n
F
t , n
I
t , n
G
t , n˜
F
t , n˜
I
t , n˜
G
t
)
to make decisions if the forecast rule is accurate, which greatly
reduces the dimension of the state space when solving the value and policy functions.
We choose the forecast rule:
log
(
θ˜t+1
)
=
(
aθ˜ + aθ˜,ιιt−1
)
log
(
θ˜t
)
+ (az + az,ιιt−1) log (zt)
+ (aξ + aξ,ιιt−1) log (ξt) + (aG + aG,ιιt−1) Gt , (106)
where A =
(
aθ˜, aθ˜,ι, az, az,ι, aξ, aξ,ι, aG, aG,ι
)
is the vector of coefficients to be determined.
To do so, we proceed as follows:
Step 1: Initialize the algorithm. We initialize the forecast rule with some initial guess:
A(0) =
(
a
(0)
θ˜
, a
(0)
θ˜,ι
, a(0)z , a
(0)
z,ι , a
(0)
ξ , a
(0)
ξ,ι , a
(0)
G , a
(0)
G,ι
)
. (107)
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Step 2: Solve for TSJV , σF , σI, and ι. Equation (67) can be rewritten as:
TSJV
(
zt, ξt, 
G
t , ιt−1, θ˜t
)
= τ · zt + β
(
1− δ − δ˜
)
ξtEt
[
TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)]
(108)
+ min
σI,t
τ · c (σI,t)− β (1− δ) piI,tξtEt
[
τ˜TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)]
+ min
σF,t
τ · c (σF,t)− β (1− δ) piF,tξtEt
[
(1− τ˜)TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)]
,
where piI,t = [φ+ (ψ + σF,t) (ψ + σI,t)]H
(
θ˜t, 1
)
, piF,t = [φ+ (ψ + σF,t) (ψ + σI,t)]H
(
1, 1/θ˜t
)
,
log
(
θ˜t+1
)
=
(
a
(q)
θ˜
+ a
(q)
θ˜,ι
ιt−1
)
log
(
θ˜t
)
+
(
a(q)z + a
(q)
z,ι ιt−1
)
log (zt)
+
(
a
(q)
ξ + a
(q)
ξ,ι ιt−1
)
log (ξt) +
(
a
(q)
G + a
(q)
G,ιιt−1
)
Gt ,
and A(q) =
(
a
(q)
θ˜
, a
(q)
θ˜,ι
, a
(q)
z , a
(q)
z,ι , a
(q)
ξ , a
(q)
ξ,ι , a
(q)
G , a
(q)
G,ι
)
is the vector of coefficients of the forecast rule
in the q-th iteration.
The equilibrium type ιt is determined by the best response functions implied by equation
(101) and the history dependence of equilibrium selection. If ιt−1 = 0 (passive equilibrium in
period t− 1), we verify whether the passive equilibrium still exists in the current period t, i.e.,
ιt = 0, by checking whether:
arg min
σI,t≥0
c (σI,t)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σI,t)ψ] ξtEt
[
τ˜TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt = 0, θ˜t+1
)]
= 0
(109)
arg min
σF,t≥0
c (σF,t)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σF,t)ψ] ξtEt
[
(1− τ˜)TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt = 0, θ˜t+1
)]
= 0
(110)
hold. If these conditions hold, ιt = ιt−1 = 0. Otherwise, ιt = 1.
Analogously, if ιt−1 = 1 (active equilibrium in period t− 1), we verify whether the active
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equilibrium still exists in the current period, i.e., ιt = 1, by checking whether:
arg min
σI,t≥0
c (σI,t)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σI,t) (ψ + σF,t)] ξtEt
[
τ˜TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt = 1, θ˜t+1
)]
> 0
(111)
arg min
σF,t≥0
c (σF,t)− β˜ [φ+ (ψ + σI,t) (ψ + σF,t)] ξtEt
[
(1− τ˜)TSJV
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt = 1, θ˜t+1
)]
> 0
(112)
hold. If these conditions hold, ιt = ιt−1 = 1. Otherwise, ιt = 0.
Given the forecast rule with A(q), we can solve for the value function TSJV , the policy
function σ, and the transition rule ι with equation (108) and conditions (109)-(112) using value
function iteration.
Step 3: Solve for T˜ S and θ. Equation (59) can be rewritten, for i ∈ {I, F}, as:
T˜ S
(
zt, ξt, 
G
t , ιt−1, θ˜t
)
= −h− c (σi,t)
+ βξtEt

(1− δ) pii,t∆TS
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)
+(
(1− δ)− (1− τ) θαi
(
zt, ξt, 
G
t , ιt−1, θ˜t
))
∗T˜ S
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)
 , (113)
where we have used the fact that ∆TSi,t+1 = TSi,t+1 − T˜ Si,t+1 and µi,t = θαi,t.
We also have, for i ∈ {I, F}, the free-entry condition implied by equation (54):
χ = βξtτθ
α−1
i,t
(
zt, ξt, 
G
t , ιt−1, θ˜t
)
Et
[
T˜ S
(
zt+1, ξt+1, 
G
t+1, ιt, θ˜t+1
)]
. (114)
With ∆TSi,t, σI,t, σF,t and ιt being solved in step 2 (in particular, ∆TSt = τ˜TSJVt/τ), we
can solve for the value function T˜ Si,t and the policy function θi,t approximately with equations
(113) and (114) using value function iteration.
Step 4: Simulate the model. We simulate the model for 10,000 periods (disregarding the
first 2,000 as a burn-in) with random draws of
{
zt, ξt, 
G
t
}
. Then, we compute the realized
equilibrium inter-firm market tightness ratio θ˜t.
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Step 5: Update the forecast rule. Based on the simulated data, we update the coefficient
of the forecast rule A(q) with A(q+1) using ordinary least squares. If A(q) and A(q+1) are sufficiently
close to each other, we stop the iteration. Otherwise, we return to step 2. The converged
forecasting rule explains the fluctuations of θ˜t well, with an R
2 of 0.91.
E Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
This appendix discusses the role of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in our model. We first
establish the condition for the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the DSS (the
case with stochastic shocks is similar, but more cumbersome to derive). Then, we argue that such
a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists and is unique for the calibration in Section 5. However,
this mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is unstable: a small deviation from the mixed-strategy
makes the system converge to the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
In a mixed-strategy setting, firms randomize their search effort by choosing σ = 0 with
probability q and choosing σ = σˆ with probability (1− q). We numerically verify that there is
only one positive effort in the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Specifically, the solution to equation
(72) is unique in the range of 0 < σˆ <
√
1− φ−ψ. So firms cannot randomize their search effort
by choosing between multiple positive efforts. The random choice is independent across firms.
Due to the law of large numbers, the average search effort in both sectors is σ = q · 0 + (1− q) σˆ.
For a single firm, the inter-firm matching probability is given by pi (σ) = φ+ ψ (ψ + σ) (ψ + σ).
In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, the inter-firm matching probability takes two values:
pi (0) = φ+ ψ (ψ + σ) and pi (σˆ) = φ+ (ψ + σˆ) (ψ + σ).
A mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium consists of a tuple {q, σˆ} with σˆ ∈ (0,√1− φ− ψ) and
q ∈ (0, 1). The tuple {q, σˆ} implies that single firms are indifferent between choosing σ = 0 and
σ = σˆ, i.e., T˜ S (0) = T˜ S (σˆ). Since ∆TS (0) = TS − T˜ S (0) and ∆TS (σˆ) = TS − T˜ S (σˆ), it
holds that ∆TS (0) = ∆TS (σˆ). We denote ∆TS (0) = ∆TS (σˆ) = ∆TS.
According to equation (64):
∆TS = zsspss + β
[(
1− δ − δ˜
)
− (1− δ) pi (0)
]
∆TS, (115)
74
where c (0) = 0. From equation (61), the single firm’s total surplus with zero search effort is:
T˜ S (0) = −h+ β
[
(1− δ) pi (0) ∆TS + ((1− δ)− (1− τ) θα) T˜ S (0)
]
. (116)
Analogously, the single firm’s total surplus by choosing σˆ search effort satisfies:
T˜ S (σˆ) = −h− c (σˆ) + β
[
(1− δ) pi (σˆ) ∆TS + ((1− δ)− (1− τ) θα) T˜ S (σˆ)
]
. (117)
Since T˜ S (0) = T˜ S (σˆ) in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, combining equations (116)
and (117) delivers:
c (σˆ) = β (1− δ) (pi (σˆ)− pi (0)) ∆TS. (118)
Finally, according to the first-order condition for {σI,t, σF,t} in equation (72):
β (1− δ) (ψ + σ) ∆TS = c0 + c1σˆν . (119)
In sum, we have the three equations (115), (118), and (119) and three unknowns (i.e., σˆ, q,
∆TS). The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium exists if the system of equations has a solution for
the three unknowns. Using the calibration in Section 5, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is
q = 0.3425, σˆ = 0.0164, and ∆TS = 2.7417. The average search effort σ is (1− q)× σˆ = 0.0107.
Figure 19: Best response in the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
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The left panel in Figure 19 displays the firm’s optimal search effort in sector F as a function
of σI . The firm chooses a positive search effort if σI > 0.0107 (i.e., for values to the right of the
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vertical dashed line). The firm chooses a zero search effort if σI < 0.0107 (i.e., for values to the
left of the vertical dashed line). The firm is indifferent between choosing σ = 0.0164 and σ = 0
if σI = 0.0107 (i.e., if sector I uses the mixed-strategy qI = 0.3425, σˆI = 0.0164).
The right panel in Figure 19 plots σF as a function of σI . The firm chooses a positive search
effort if σI > 0.0107 (i.e., for values to the right of the vertical dashed line). The firm would
choose a zero search effort if σI < 0.0107 (i.e., for values to the left of the vertical dashed line).
If σI < 0.0107 (i.e., if sector I uses the mixed-strategy qI = 0.3425, σˆI = 0.0164), a fraction
of 0.3425 firms chooses σ = 0, while the rest of the firms choose σ = 0.0164, which implies
σF = 0.0107 (i.e., the cross marker).
Figure 19 shows that the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is unstable: a decrease in σI
induces all firms in sector F to search with zero effort and the system converges to the pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium with zero search effort (i.e., passive equilibrium). Similarly, an increase
in σI induces all firms in sector F to search with positive effort; hence, the system converges to
the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with positive search effort (i.e., active equilibrium).
F Simulations based on shocks to productivity
In this appendix, we complete our discussion of the effects of technology shocks in the model.
Figure 20 plots the ergodic distribution of selected variables for the case where we only have
AR(1) shocks to technology, zt (for transparency, we eliminate the discount factor shocks). As
outlined in the paper, persistent exogenous disturbances to the technological process fail to
move the system to a different equilibrium, the equilibrium is always active, and the ergodic
distributions of the variables of interest are unimodal.
In Figure 21, we plot the ergodic distribution of selected variables for the case where we
have shocks both to technology, zt and the discount factor, ξt. We recover bimodality, but this
feature is induced by the shocks to ξt and their ability to switch equilibria. The main effect of
the shocks to productivity is to spread out the ergodic distribution in Figure 11 in the main
text (only shocks to ξt) around its two modes.
Figure 22 shows the GIRFs to a range of persistent negative productivity shocks when the
economy starts from the active DSS. Negative productivity shocks are unable to generate a shift
in equilibrium even when their magnitude gets very large. In each case, the costly search effort
falls after the productivity shock, and then gradually recovers. The effect of a productivity
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Figure 20: Ergodic distribution with AR(1) shocks to zt
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Figure 21: Ergodic distribution with i.i.d. shocks to ξt and AR(1) shocks
to zt
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shock on the labor market tightness ratio and the unemployment rate is also transitory. The
mechanism is that the gain of matching with a partner (TS − T˜ S) in the active equilibrium is
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inelastic with the change in productivity. This result is similar to the one in Shimer (2005), who
points out that the gain of matching with a worker, T˜ S and TS, is inelastic with the change
in productivity in a canonical DMP model. Since T˜ S and TS move in the same direction in
reaction to productivity shocks, the response of TS − T˜ S to productivity shocks is even weaker.
As a result, the existence condition for the active equilibrium in equation (35) keeps holding: if
we start at the active DSS, firms find it desirable to search actively for a partner even when
productivity is low.
Figure 22: GIRFs to a negative productivity shock
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Note: Each panel shows the response of a variable to a negative productivity shock (z) with
magnitudes of 0.05 (blue line), 0.10 (red line), 0.15 (black line), and 0.20 (green line).
We also experiment with permanent changes in productivity. In period t = 1, the economy
starts from the active DSS with positive search effort, and in period t = 2 a permanent fall in
productivity hits the economy. This permanent shock may shift the equilibrium of the system
by affecting the expected gain of match Et(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1). For example, in an economy in the
active equilibrium, a sufficiently large fall in zt decreases the expected gain from joint venture
formation and moves the system to the passive equilibrium.
We use the model to assess the magnitude of the fall in zt needed to move the system from
the active to the passive equilibrium. Figure 23 shows the GIRFs of selected variables to a 19%
(solid line), 23% (dashed line) and 35% (dot-dashed line) permanent decline in productivity
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(zt), respectively. The first two shocks are unable to move the system to the active equilibrium
because the expected gain from inter-firm matching is relatively inelastic to permanent changes
in productivity. Productivity shocks induce J˜i,t+1 and Ji,t+1 to comove, leading to a weak
response of Et(Ji,t+1 − J˜i,t+1) to the shock. As we mentioned above, this finding is consistent
with Shimer (2005). In comparison, a sufficiently large productivity shock of 35% pushes the
economy to the passive equilibrium. This analysis suggests that a permanent productivity shock
is unlikely to move the system between equilibria unless the shock is massive.
Figure 23: GIRFs to a negative permanent productivity shock
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Note: Each panel shows the response of a variable to a permanent negative productivity shock (z) with
magnitudes of 0.19 (solid line), 0.23 (dashed line), and 0.35 (dot-dashed line).
G Volatility of shocks
Figure 24 plots the ergodic distribution of endogenous variables with i.i.d. shocks to ξ in the
case of high volatility. Figure 25 repeats the same exercise, but in the case of low volatility. In
both figures, we see the bimodal distributions that we discussed in the main text and the long
left tail of output when the volatility of ξt is high.
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Figure 24: Ergodic distribution with i.i.d. shocks to ξ, high volatility
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Figure 25: Ergodic distribution with i.i.d. shocks to ξ, low volatility
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H GIRFs to government spending shock in the active
equilibrium
This appendix studies the effect of government spending shocks when the economy starts from
the active equilibrium. Figure 26 shows the response in the level of selected variables to a 15%
(the solid line) and an 18% (the dashed line) government spending shock. Since the economy is
already in the active equilibrium, the effects of the fiscal expansion are limited and transitory.
Figure 26: GIRFs to positive government spending shock in the active
equilibrium
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Note: Each panel shows the response of a variable to a one-period 15% (solid line) and 18% (dashed
line) increase in government spending.
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